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DUE PROCESS OF REBELLION
Luis KUTNER*
Liberty is a boisterous sea. Timid men prefer the dead calm of
despotism. **
Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.***
For some 3,500 years, man has been at war nine hours out of every
ten. During the past twenty years, mankind has survived 379 armed
conflicts. Beginning with the American and French Revolutions, the
dominant characteristic of the contemporary world has been revolution.
The Soviet, Chinese and other contemporary revolutions are extensions
of what may be regarded as a revolutionary tradition. The purpose of
these revolutions is not merely to replace one authority with another,
but to change the underlying social system.' The underlying ideology of
these revolutions encompasses such universal values that revolution in
one country challenges the status quo elsewhere and posits a change in
the international system.' Clearly, revolution or acts of rebellion in one
state involve questions of international law such as intervention or non-
intervention by other states or by the international community, the right
of national self-determination, the rights of dejure and de facto govern-
* LL.B.; J.D.; a member of the Illinois and Indiana Bar; 1972 Congressional nominee for
the Nobel Peace Prize; former visiting Associate Professor, Yale Law School; Chairman, World
Habeas Corpus Committee, World Peace Through Law Center; Chairman, Commission for Inter-
national Due Process of Law; former Consul, Ecuador; former Consul General, Guatemala; former
Special Counsel to the Attorney General of Illinois; and author of numerous law journal articles
and several books, including World Habeas Corpus and I, the Lawyer. The research assistance of
Michael Kaufman and Ernest Katin, Ph.D. is acknowledged.
** From a letter which is of great significance in the history of the freedom of the press.
Publisher Woodfall was prosecuted for seditious libel; the jury brought in a verdict of "guilty of
printing and publishing only." After a second trial, Woodfall was freed on payment of costs. J.
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 1002b (13th ed. 1955).
* ** Motto on Thomas Jefferson's seal (circa 1776).
The Editorial Board has made every attempt to verify the sources cited herein; however, some
of the authorities relied upon were unavailable and the responsibility for their accuracy is essen-
tially the author's.
1. See generally H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1961).
2. REVOLUTION IN WORLD POLITICS 5-10 (M. Kaplan & N. Katzenbach ed. 1962).
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ments, and the rights of individuals who have committed-or are af-
fected by-acts of rebellion or revolution.
The focus of this work is upon the international protection of the
rights of both active and passive participants in revolutionary action.
The basis for such international protection lies in the recognition of the
right to rebel under certain circumstances and upon a consideration of
the international consequences of revolution. Specifically, parts I-VI
examine the origins and effect of conventional international law con-
cerning rebellion. Part VII discusses various suggestions for the estab-
lishment of international tribunals and the Writ of World Habeas Cor-
pus.3 The internal causes and characteristics of revolution are discussed
in detail in part VIII, followed by prominent examples of 20th century
social revolutions. In the final portion, the author urges the application
of due process principles by existing and proposed international tribun-
als.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMATE REBELLION
Political writers from antiquity have stressed the need for obedi-
ence to law and the horrors of anarchy. However, private action to
overthrow a tyrant has been considered justified. In the republican city-
states of Greece, the tyrant was a usurper; thus, it was considered as
honorable for a citizen to stake his life in an attempt to remove the
usurper as it was for him to sacrifice his life to repel the invader. Though
at first "tyranny" referred to the method by which the tyrant came to
power, the term later came to refer to the nature of the rule.' To Plato,
the distinguishing characteristic of the tyrant is his egocentric and licen-
tious disregard of the welfare of the people he rules. In Plato's view, the
mechanical test of legality or constitutionality is not the fundamental
issue; what is more important is the ruler himself and the nature of his
rule. Similarly, Aristotle regarded tyranny as a perversion of monarchy
3. L. KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS (1962), Kutner, World Habeas Corpus, Human
Rights and World Community, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 3 (1967); Goldberg, An Introduction to World
Habeas Corpus, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1967); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: A Legal Ligament
for Political Diversity, 43 U. DET. L.J. 79 (1965); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: The Legal
Ultimate for the Unity of Mankind, 40 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 570 (1965); Kutner, Due Process
of Family Privacy: World Civil Liberty and World Habeas Corpus, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 597 (1967);
Kutner, World Habeas Corpus for International Man: A Credo for International Due Process of
Law, 36 U. DET. L.J. 235 (1959); Brennan, International Due Process and the Law, Law and
Layman Conference, American Bar Assn., Aug. 7, 1962, in 108 CONG. REC. A6774 (daily ed.,
Sept. 13, 1962); Kefauver, International Due Process and the Law 108 CONG. REC. A6774 (daily
ed., Sept. 13, 1962); Comment, World Habeas Corpus, 7 INDIANA L.Q. REV. 1173 (1963).
4. 0. JASZI & J. LEWIS, AGAINST THE TYRANT 4 (1957). For a systems analysis see N. LEITES
& C. WOLF, REBELLION AND AUTHORITY, AN ANALYTIC ESSAY ON INSURGENT CONFLICTS (1970).
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in which the leader exercises irresponsible rule over subjects against
their will, with a view to his own private interests rather than the inter-
ests of the persons ruled. Tyranny is marked by the arbitrary and irre-
sponsible power of a single individual. Neither Plato nor Aristotle seri-
ously considered arguments for tyrannicide or resistance of the tyrant;
these considerations were developed by later writers.
Cicero and the Stoic philosophers stressed the importance of natu-
ral law, derived from right reason, in binding the commonwealth. Al-
though opposed to the dissolution of the Roman Republic, Cicero justi-
fied the assassination of Julius Caesar under the natural law.' Seneca,
who saw the depths to which political degeneration could descend under
the tyranny of Nero, recommended tyrannicide as the only cure. Al-
though the Roman jurists recognized that what pleases the prince has
the force of law, they also developed the doctrine that even imperial
power is subject to the law's control. The sharp distinction between the
lawful ruler, who seeks the common good, and the tyrant, who ruling
by force, seeks first his own ends, was fundamental in both Greek and
Roman political thought.
Early Christians, following Paul, adhered to the belief that govern-
ment is made necessary by the depravity of man and insisted upon the
Christian duty of obedience to the ruler, who was considered to be God's
instrument for repressing evil. Such commandments as "[t]he powers
that be are ordained by God" and the injunction to "submit yourselves
to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake" were the guidelines for
early believers.' Augustine stressed that the authority of all rulers is
derived from God and hence is subject to obedience. Though recognizing
that one who kills another in obedience to God's direct command is not
guilty of sinful murder, the direction of Augustine's writing upholds the
divine right of kings. According to Augustine and Gregory the Great,
God sends good kings as well as bad, and those who murmur against
the rulers murmur against God.8 However, one early church father,
Isidor of Seville, distinguished between kings and tyrants and urged that
the title "king" belongs to him who governs rightly and is lost to those
who govern unrighteously. Pope Nicholas I stressed that obedience is
required to him who is truly a king.
Medieval thinkers were particularly concerned with the problem of
5. 0. JASZI & J. LEWIS, AGAINST THE TYRANT 9 (1957).
6. Id. at 10-11.
7. Romans 13:1-5; 1 Peter 2:13-14.
8. 0. JASZI & J. LEWIS, AGAINST THE TYRANT 13-15 (1957).
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resistance to authority. Though the king's rule was acknowledged to be
absolute, it was still subject to the law. To Bracton, this meant that the
king may not alter or abolish the law. He must not change the tradi-
tional form of government; his judgments of right must follow the rules
laid down by custom; and he cannot take the property of his subjects
(except as penalty for crime) without their consent? Other scholars
stressed adherence to the ethical and rational principles derived from
natural law. Divine law was also held to limit the king. The king derives
authority from the community and acts on the community's behalf. Any
check on his authority can only come through private resistance by
individuals or groups. Within this context, the tyrant can be differen-
tiated from the king. The tyrant bases his authority not on law, but on
force. While the king assumes a likeness of divinity, the tyrant takes on
the likeness of the devil. 10 Wycliff, however, believed that the tyrant
must be obeyed, with punishment to the ruler coming in the hereafter.
Aquinas and Occam asserted the right to disobey those commands
which were either contrary to fundamental law or outside the scope of
the ruler's legitimate authority. Strong currents of medieval thought
supported the view that the king who misuses his power may be resisted
forcefully. The idea of contractual obligations between king and subject
was first explicitly expressed by Manegold of Lautenbach." Though
Aquinas regarded sedition as a moral sin, he did not consider it seditious
to resist a tyrant. Rather, it is the tyrant who, in violating the law,
commits sedition. But Aquinas, citing ancient and hence inapplicable
precedents, opposed private action against a tyrant who has a legiti-
mate title to rule, urging instead appeal to higher authority. Some writ-
ers sought an institutional check by appeal to the Pope. Marsiglio of
Padua urged the establishment of an independent agency of the people
to discipline the ruler.
Clearly, while the doctrine of tyrannicide was not predominant in
medieval thought, it was consistent with the main tendencies of medieval
political theory. The king, as protector of the common good, is bound
by the principles of nature which objectively define this common good.
The resister of the law-defying tyrant acts not for the protection of his
own private values, but for protection of the entire community. Tyranni-
cide and resistance function as an institutionalized check upon the ruler.
Though ultimate authority stems from God, immediate authority comes
9. Id. at 19.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 31.
12. Id. at 26-27.
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from the common will of the community. No one denied that a private
person may resist and take the life of a tyrant without title; the problem
arose with regard to the right of a private person in relation to a titled
ruler who becomes a tyrant by abuse of power.
In the early modern period, characterized by the centralized au-
thority of the kings, the trend was toward absolutism. Though Luther
had contempt for the dignity of princes, he denounced resistance. Calvin
was also opposed to the resistance of authority, but followers such
as John Knox urged resistance where religious belief was threatened.
John Knox condoned Protestant resistance to Mary Tudor and Mary
Stuart.' 3 Resistance was also condoned when the French persecuted the
Huguenots. Thus, the development of Protestant thought ranged from
a theory of passive obedience to theoretical support for the right and
duty of resistance. The growth of the resistance theory was basically a
response to the political situation in Scotland and France. Those who
supported resistance relied upon the earlier medieval body of thought.
Two significant 16th century humanists who justified rebellion were
John Buchanan and Etienne de la Boetie. Buchanan, in defending the
deposition of Mary Stuart, argued in his De Juri Regni and Seotos that
the authority of kings is established by the consent of the people, resting
on a social contract which encompasses the king's acceptance of the rule
of law." The law, like the king's authority, is derived from the com-
munity; thus, those who confer authority on the king can limit that
authority as well as punish kings who exceed that authority. When the
king dissolves the bonds of authority, no obedience is owed to him.
Under these circumstances, a rebellion is justified and a private person
may kill the law-defying king. La Boetie's Discourse on Voluntary
Servitude departed from Aristotelian and medieval conventions by dig-
ging at the roots of tyranny. He found psychological reasons for the
roots of tyranny in the fact that custom gradually wears away man's
natural love of liberty and leads to his submission to servitude. Tyranny,
then, is supported by a hierarchy of those who benefit from the tyrant.
La Boetie's cure for tyranny lay in passive resistance, the refusal of the
subjects to consent and obey.'5
Two Jesuit writers who justified tyrannicide were Suarez and Mar-
iana. Mariana's De Regis Institutione, published in 1599, included a
bitter denunciation of tyranny, urging that the people from whom a king
13. Id. at 48-49. See generally Kenyon, A Hectic Revolution, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS, Jan. 4, 1968, at 27-29.
14. 0. JASZI & J. LEWIS, AGAINST THE TYRANT 53-56 (1957).
15. Id. at 56-57. (La Boetie was a Catholic.)
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derives power may overthrow him. According to Mariana, there is no
question that a usurper-a person who assumes authority without a
valid title-may be killed by anyone since he is a public enemy. Where,
however, a rightful king abuses his authority, his power must be toler-
ated more patiently. If the king destroys the commonwealth, plunders
private fortunes, or holds the laws and religion in contempt, a represent-
ative body must warn him. If the king refuses to heed the warning, this
body can depose him and there exists a justification for his death. If the
ruler prevents the convening of a public assembly, this in itself is conclu-
sive evidence of his tyranny, and the king can be overthrown. Before
taking any action, however, the liberator should first consult "learned
and grave men."" Mariana's book was burned in France. Mariana's
views departed from those of Suarez and the traditional Jesuit and
Catholic approach in that Mariana was not concerned with the right of
the Pope to absolve subjects from their allegiance, thus tending to be
more secular and conventional. In France, the Jesuits were denounced
as disturbers of the public peace, while in England, Presbyterians, as
well as Jesuits, were similarly denounced. 7
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the concept of the social con-
tract was formulated in English thought by Hobbes and Locke. To
Hobbes, the sovereignty of the state is based upon the social contract,
which ends the war of one-against-all in the state of nature. Authority
is considered necessary for individual security. An individual may not
breach his contractual obligations-especially the obligation to obey the
sovereign-unless the state threatens to take his life. Thus, a prisoner
condemned to death has the natural right to attempt an escape." Locke,
however, perceived the individual as having certain rights in the state
of nature which are retained subsequent to the formation of the social
contract. Where these rights are infringed, as by the denial of property,
a right to rebel exists." The right of rebellion is based upon a two-party
relationship between the people and their government. Locke's concept
influenced the framers of the Declaration of Independence who justified
the revolt of the American colonies. 20
The defense of the right of tyrannicide and of rebellion throughout
the 17th century was essentially conservative in that the object was to
16. Id. at 68-71.
17. Id.
18. Hobbes, Leviathan in SOCIAL CONTRACT 107-09 (Barker ed. 1952).
19. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (1683) in SOCIAL CONTRACT 100-04 (Bar-
ker ed. 1952).
20. Stern, John Locke and the Declaration of Independence, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 186
(1966).
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destroy an improper innovation and restore former values to the com-
munity, not to clear the way for new social organization. The justifica-
tion for tyrannicide and rebellion was the vindication of commonly
,shared and well-rooted values. In the 17th century, the issue arose within
the context of conflict between emerging absolutist monarchs and the
older traditions. At first, many thinkers considered enlightened absolut-
ism as derived from the divine right to eliminate feudal anarchy and
religious wars. Subsequently, there was an emerging awareness that the
new absolutism leads to the development of tyrannical traits and oppres-
sion. However, the feeling developed that the mere killing of the king
does not solve the problem of a tyrannical system. The community must
not only resist, but also establish new constitutional institutions. Within
this context, Locke conceived that a tyrannical system causes authority
to revert back to the community, thus giving the people the right to
revolt. The American colonists were clearly the heirs of this tradition.
To Jefferson, resistance against tyranny is not merely justified but at
times positively essential to the maintenance of human liberty."' But, as
with Locke, mere resistance to a tyrant is not considered adequate; thus,
the participants in the American Revolution deliberately constructed a
constitution based on a theory of representative government with checks
and balances to restrain power. The concept of separation of powers was
considered fundamental to the protection of freedom. 2
The French Revolution, like the American, emphasized the symbol
of the tyrant. Particularly, the Jacobins and the leftwing revolutionaries
believed themselves to be the successors of the old Romans who had
fought for the liberty of the Republic. The debate concerning the execu-
tion of Louis XVI centered upon the symbol of the tyrant. Merely
killing the tyrant was an insufficient measure. Tom Paine declared:
"Execute the king but not the man!"' Thus, by the end of the 18th
century, thinking turned away from theories of tyrannicide and individ-
ual resistance and toward theories of revolution. Under the new theories
of revolution, the use of force by the entire community is the avenue
through which people can eliminate unbearable abuses. By so doing, the
people can increase individual and social happiness by crushing the
21. Jefferson, in reacting to Shay's Rebellion, stated:
God forbid that we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. . . .What
country can preserve its liberties, if their rulers are not warned from time to time that the
people preserve the spirit of resistance? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time
to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural nature.
II MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME xvii, 165-67 (1951).
22. 0. JASZI & J. LEWis, AGAINST THE TYRANT 104-05 (1957).
23. Id. at 110.
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whole corrupt regime. The people can also create a new and better
constitution in which representative government, separation of powers,
and the definition of inalienable human rights serve as institutional
checks against the very possibility of tyranny. 4
In the 19th century, new concepts of tyranny emerged. Bentham,
who rejected natural law concepts, defined tyranny in terms of degrees
of unhappiness. When, according to his hedonistic calculus, the amount
of unhappiness exceeds the amount of happiness, one has the right to
resist authority and to rebel. While Bentham believed that representa-
tive government effectively serves to harmonize the self-interest of the
rulers with the self-interest of the ruled, he feared that the unenlightened
masses can themselves become tyrannical. The true tyranny of human
ignorance, stupidity and superstitution is, of course, invisible. An an-
archist such as Tolstoy condemns the entire social structure as immoral
since it is founded on force. To Marx, tyranny is derived from the laws
of economic evolution and the class structure. Many of Marx's follow-
ers opposed acts of individual violence and revolt, believing rather in the
laws of economic determinism.
The old tradition of tyrannicide was retained in Italy where liberal
writers protested against the petty tyrants who emerged during the
struggle for freedom and unity. The Italian tradition furnished the moti-
vating force for other revolutionary movements. During the French
Revolution, the doctrine of tyrannicide was espoused by Babeoufism
and also by Blanqui, who, in 1824, sought to seize power through revolt
of an armed minority and thus establish the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat. Between 1837 and 1870, the Blanquists participated in 13 uprisings.
Interestingly, Blanqui's concepts were later revived by Lenin. Nine-
teenth century anarchists such as Bakunin and Kropotkin regarded both
the political and economic systems then existing as tyrannous, thereby
justifying individual revolts. A similar tradition of putschism existed in
central Europe. In contrast, the responsible leaders of Marxism repu-
diated putschism. For example, Lenin conceived the role of the intellec-
tual as including a duty to expose the tyranny of the prevailing sys-
tem-not only as it pertains to the proletariat, but as it affects all
classes.25
With the advent of the German resistance to Nazism, there devel-
oped a new social concept of revolt. To groups of German Catholics and
24. Id.
25. See generally V. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (1916). The Marxist position is sum-
marized in S. HOOK, MARX AND THE MARXISTS: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY (1951).
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Protestants, the bestiality of the Nazi regime created a moral obligation
to organize conspiracies for revolt which culminated in plots to assassi-
nate Hitler. Theologians such as Max Pribilla6 and Otto Dibelius reiter-
ated the traditional doctrines as to the right of resistance and revolt
when the state exceeds the bounds of morality.
The dictatorships of the 20th century represent the emergence of a
new and systematic form of tyranny, differing from the 18th century
absolute monarchies and the Napoleonic Empires. In some ways, the
tyrannies of these recent dictatorships are similar to the tyrannies of the
city-states of antiquity and the Renaissance. The similarities include: (1)
personal rule unbounded by law; (2) military despotism based on private
armies; (3) continuous ventures into dangerous diplomatic situations
with the risk of war; (4) luxury and ostentation typifying the life style
of the dictator and his "gang"; (5) bounteous remuneration for the
obedient servants of the system; (6) intimidation of the people; and, (7)
suppression which leaves no possibility for the expression of opinions
contrary to the dictatorship for the organization of popular forces to
effectuate change. The depravity of the moral structure is the element
common to both the old tyranny and the new totalitarianism. The mod-
em tyrannies, however, making use of contemporary technology, exhibit
a higher degree of moral depravity. Nevertheless, there have arisen a
number of dictatorial regimes which may be regarded as more enlight-
ened, such as that of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. The new tyranny differs
from the old only by espousing a doctrine such as Fascism or Commun-
ism. The general aim is to make total the annihilation of the individual
personality. There are, however, significant differences between tyran-
nies, e.g., between Fascism and Bolshevism. The latter has not engaged
in some of the excesses of systematic murder characteristic of the for-
mer.8
Colonialism is still another context wherein revolt against authority
has found justification. Gandhi, beginning in the 1920's, led organized
campaigns of passive resistance to disobedience against what he and the
26. Pribilla, An den Grenzen der Stats gewalt, 142 STIMMEN DER ZEIT, MONATSSCHRIFT
FUR DAS GEISTESLEBEN DER GEGENWART 410 (1948).
27. 0. JASZI & J. LEwis, AGAINST THE TYRANT 203 (1957). Debelius, however, takes a
lukewarm position, contending that the resister would involve himself in guilt. Pribilla is more
outspoken in justifying rebellion to Nazism.
28. Id. at ch. xix. However, there were many parallels between Stalin's and Hitler's totalitar-
ianism. See generally H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1952). Significantly, Fidel
Castro, in his famous defense speech at the Moncada Trial in Santiago De Cuba in 1953 made
reference to the classical arguments regarding the resistance to tyranny in justifying his revolt
against Batista. F. CASTRO, HISTORY WILL ABSOLVE ME (1969).
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Indian Congress Party regarded as the imposition of immoral rule by
Britain in India. Influenced by Thoreau and Tolstoy, as well as by
Hindu tradition, Gandhi based his resistance on principles of non-
violence as governed by Satyagraha and Ahimsa to effect a change in
the heart and mind of the oppressor. These methods, with modification,
were applied in Africa and in the civil rights struggle in the United
States. Although unsuccessful, the late Albert Luthuli led a series of
civil disobedience campaigns against the system of apartheid in South
Africa.29
Many of the colonial revolutions such as those in Palestine, Indone-
sia, Cyprus, Indochina and Algeria were of a violent nature. A system
of guerrilla warfare and terrorism was employed to expel the colonial
power. The struggle for national independence in Asia and Africa is
being stimulated by ideologies of nationalism and popular sovereignty.
These philosophies, originally imported from the West, have achieved
universal application."
Clearly, the justification for rebellion and revolution is derived
from a tradition of political thought having roots in antiquity. This
tradition was adapted to Christian principles by medieval theologians
and further refined in the course of the Reformation and the struggle
for popular sovereignty in the 16th and 17th centuries. The principles
were transformed in the 19th and 20th centuries in order to promote the
overthrow of institutions deemed tyrannous and the establishment of
constitutional systems based on popular freedom conducive to the devel-
opment of human dignity. The rise of totalitarianism in the 20th century
has created situations wherein revolt may become morally obligatory.
The struggle for independence by oppressed peoples has also created
situations in which rebellion is justified.
II. FORMS OF REBELLION
Power is defined as the capacity of a group or an individual to
modify the conduct of other individuals. The organized and sanctioned
power in a society is designated as "authority," having the capacity to
make binding decisions for the community." This capacity is the func-
tion of popular consent-active or passive acceptance by the population.
This consent is frequently related to the objectives pursued by an elite
29. M. SIBLEY, THE QUIET BATTLE 236-87 (Anchor ed. 1963).
30. See generally THE REVOLUTION IN WORLD POLITICS (M. Kaplan & N. Katzenbach ed.
1962).
31. The discussion in this section is based generally upon A. JANOS, THE SEIZURE OF POWER
AND POPULAR CONSENT (1964).
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on behalf of the community. Sometimes this consent is granted when
the elite is regarded as legitimatized by moral or metaphysical consider-
ations. Where these sources of consent are absent, the elite engaged in
pursuing social objectives must rely on force exercised by armies, police
units and other instruments of coercion. Hence, authority is a balance
of force and consent with respect to a set of social objectives. Though
an element of force is needed, consent is also needed for the functioning
of social institutions. The seizure of power is the seizure of a balance of
coercion and consent which involves not only the capture of the instru-
ments of force in society but also the winning of a certain degree of
popular acceptance. The objectives of the elite must conform to changes
in society. Where values and social expectations change, the structure
of authority undergoes crises, of which revolution is the most extreme
form. Revolution involves the termination of state authority and presup-
poses the collapse of both consensus and organized force. Once the
instruments of force disintegrate simultaneously with, or as a result of,
popular rebellion, revolution is likely. The revolutionary seizure of
power involves the destruction of the old power base and the establish-
ment of a new one. There need not be a mass rebellion. The key to
success is massive alienation from the old government. The strategy for
revolution was well developed by the Bolsheviks and subsequently by
Mao Tse Tung.
While revolution involves the complete disintegration of state insti-
tutions, the coup d'etat involves the seizure of these institutions with the
new authority evolving from the old. The loyalties of the effective power
instruments of the state are transferred from one group or individual to
another, with a gap being created between formal and effective power
in society. Subsequently, the holders of formal power are forced to
withdraw or be eliminated. Often, the existing heads of state are coerced
to sanction their own demise by signing a document or by submitting
to a vote of confidence extorted behind closed doors. The process may
not be sudden or dramatic, and it is often even orderly. One type of coup
d'etat is the palace revolution in which a small group of conspirators
removes one of its number by arrest or assassination. A palace revolu-
tion occurred when Mussolini was deposed in 1943 as a result of a
conspiracy involving King Victor Emmanuel, the members of the Fas-
cist Grand Council and a number of high ranking military officers.
Another recent palace revolution occurred in Soviet Russia, leading to
the ascendency of Khrushchev and subsequently of Brezhnev and Kosy-
gin. Another type of coup is characterized by conspirators who, while
unable to gain control of the state apparatus, nonetheless represent
important factions within society, such as the army, which factions
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enable them to move in response to popular dissatisfaction. The crucial
element in this form of coup is the threat of civil conflict which may be
regarded as a greater evil than the ascendency of the political opponent.
The coup does not develop suddenly, but involves extensive plotting. An
alternative approach lies in infiltration, which is the placement of
trusted individuals in strategic positions in an attempt to change the
loyalties and goals of established organizations. This approach is used
by the Communists of Eastern Europe.
In contrast to a revolution in which popular support is achieved
first, followed by the seizure of the state apparatus, a coup entails first
the seizure of authority and then the gaining of popular consent. The
participation of the military alone is insufficient for gaining popular
support. An aura of legitimacy, such as the inclusion of cabinet minis-
ters and members of parliament, is needed. An attempt is usually made
to coerce approval from political leaders. Parliamentary institutions
may be taken over by rigging the elections.
Putschism is the term applied to a crude and unsuccessful attempt
to seize power. Such an attempt, as was undertaken by Blanqui, was
criticized by the Bolsheviks who eschewed the mere occupation of the
chancery and stressed the importance of acting only when conditions
favoring a seizure of power were present. Nevertheless, the sudden
putsch has been attempted in countless instances and romanticized by
some writers. A comic example is Hitler's beer hall putsch in Munich.
Sometimes an attempt is made to capture one instrumentality, such as
the effort by Chilean Nazis in 1938 to take only the radio station.
Until World War II, the popular image of revolutions was closely
connected with barricades, urban masses and storming politics. The
success of the partisans in Europe and the victory of guerrilla move-
ments in Asia have popularized terrorism and mobile guerrilla warfare.
Though there have been a number of successful campaigns, there have
also been some failures. The success of guerrilla warfare lies in combin-
ing military techniques with the establishment of base areas of popular
support in the mobilization and creation of revolutionary authority, as
was well perceived by Mao. The authority of the state cannot be seized
by military power alone. Putsches often result in failure because they
emphasize the destructive and ignore the constructive aspects of the
seizure of power.
The forms of rebellion which have been undertaken have had inter-
national consequences. The international community and the states
which comprise it must determine whether intervention is to be under-
taken to determine the course of a particular revolutionary situation.
Questions arise involving recognition of a change of government, the
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status of insurgents and the rights of individuals who have been affected
by acts of rebellion or who are or have been rebels.
III. INTERVENTION
In considering the question of intervention in domestic civil strife,
a distinction must be made between'doctrinal norms and actual practice.
The principles of national self-determination and the sovereign equality
of all states, as asserted by the United Nations Charter and the equivo-
cal lexicon of statesmen, presuppose that every state has a right to
determine its own form of government, its own economic system, and
its own ideology, free from outside interference. For example, the
United States self-righteously refused to recognize the Manchuko re-
gime, which had been created by Japan ifh Manchuria in 1933, claiming
it constituted the imposition of a regime by a foreign power. 2
This element in the international law of rebellion is derived from
the doctrine of sovereignty, but it can readily be seen that its actual
derivation emanates from the doctrine of "true" rebellion in the tradi-
tional sense. However, the duty does not require each state to suppress
all activities of private persons within its jurisdiction which may be
inimical to the interests of a foreign government, for to so hold would
be tantamount to denying the right of rebellion altogether. Modern
rebellions are often launched by nationals of one state (who presumably
have the right to rebel) while on the territory of another state. Thus,
when the Russian Revolution broke out, Trotsky was in New York and
Lenin in Switzerland. Each had not ceased during his years of exile to
devote himself to the cause of the revolution; to have required the Amer-
ican and Swiss governments to suppress the activities of these men in
the name of international law would have turned international law into
a scheme of mutual insurance for existing governments. States are
merely under an obligation to prevent subversive activity against foreign
governments which assumes the form of armed attack or crimes against
life and property. Thus, on the occasion of the assassination of King
Alexander in Marseilles in 1934, the Council of the League of Nations
declared: "It is the duty of every State neither to encourage nor to
tolerate on its territory any terrorist activity with a political pur-
pose."33 On the other hand, political action which takes the form of
conspiracy and propaganda is not ordinarily considered the responsibil-
ity of the government on whose territory it occurs in the absence of
governmental aid or incitement.3 4
32. 1 HACKWORTH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 335-38 (1940).
33. 38 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 78-79 (1944).
34. An exception exists in the Geneva Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause
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This element of the law of nations has also been enacted by the
United States and codified as 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1964):
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or
sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes
the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedi-
tion or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the
territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any
colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at
Peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both.
The enactment of similar legislation in other nations should be an
institutional goal of due process of rebellion since it restricts the capac-
ity of nationals of one state, or government acting through them, to
"impose rebellion" on the people of another. However, it is not the
understanding of the Department of State that the statute is applicable
to regimes unrecognized by the United States. In the case of The Three
Friends,3 5 however, the Supreme Court appears to have conceded-if
only arguendo-that a prior diplomatic recognition was necessary to
invoke the prohibition of the statute. Dicta in the case of The
Carondolet36 may also support this position. The Carondolet involved
an alleged violation of R.S. § 5283 (the predecessor of 18
U.S.C. § 960) by the fitting out of a vessel to aid one unrecognized
faction against another unrecognized faction. The court said:
The United States can hardly be said to be "at peace" in the
sense of the statute, with a faction which they are unwilling to
recognize as a government; nor could the cruising, or commit-
ting of hostilities against such a mere faction be well said to
be committing hostilities against the "subjects, citizens, or
property of a district or people" within the meaning of the
statute .31
If this be an accurate statement of the law, it is apparent that remedial
legislation may be necessary to close a significant loophole in the U.S.
Code which invites acts contrary to the law of nations and to the concept
of Peace, to which 21 states became parties. This Convention prohibited broadcasting detrimental
to good international understanding. See M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965)
for a resume of the pact. See also Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda
against Foreign States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 649 (1934).
35. 166 U.S. 1 (1897).
36. 37 F. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1889).
37. Id. at 800.
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of "fair" or "true" rebellion, a concept which, this article argues, must
be protected.
Due process of rebellion makes it possible that nations may enact
by general consent a code of self-restraint in dealing with the phenome-
non of revolt so that domestic rebellion may be limited. The progress
of the technology of rebellion and the increasing capability of leadership
to incite others to join a rebellion have been rapid enough to create some
confusion in the application of the older "rules." As an example, one
may cite the blurring of the traditional line between hostile propaganda
by a state and hostile propaganda by a private person. Before the rise
of modern totalitarianism, it was assumed that a state acted as a matter
of course only through governmental organs openly identifiable as such.
But this assumption is invalid in a state where a single party or group
has established a monopoly of power and reduced the nominal govern-
ment to an "executive committee." In such a state, all the organs of
expression of opinion, as well as those of political organization, express
the will of the ruling extra-governmental force. In such circumstances
of organic connection among all the manifestations of collective life, it
makes little sense to attach culpability for internationally hostile acts
to the government only. Political party newspapers, and even the acts
of private persons, must be regarded as expressing the will of the state.
Although this principle has been recognized by certain writers,"s it
cannot yet be said to be a doctrine of international law. Its application
is hindered by the unwillingness of totalitarian states to abandon the
pretence of individual and group pluralism. The People's Republic of
China, as an instance, maintains a parliament in which several parties,
as well as the overwhelming majority of Communists, are represented.
It is a characteristic of totalitarian states to assert that a perfect freedom
is achieved within their borders and that the strictures demanded by the
ruling group are really imposed by the people, collectively and individu-
ally, as an exercise in consensus. Such claims are not subject to verifica-
tion or disproof before any international tribunal, yet accepting them
at face value often leads to absurdities.
When the Mayor of New York, Fiorello LaGuardia, made an
attack on the head of the German government in a public address in
1937, that government complained and the government of the United
States issued an official apology. The apology was apparently given on
the theory that international law prohibits such remarks by officials
38. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW & ITS IMPORT IN THE
AMERICAS 273-79 (1956).
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even if the official holds a merely local office under a federal system. 9
Obviously, statements made by an American official in LaGuardia's
position cannot reasonably be equated with statements made by an
official of the then existing German government. Yet, international law
contains no doctrine with which to distinguish such cases.
A similar difficulty exists in the case of propaganda disseminated
by radio and television. It has been contended that broadcasts hostile
to a particular state and receivable in that state are hostile acts within
the meaning of the traditional prohibition of international law. This is
equally true when those broadcasts are said to be only for national
distribution. One writer compares them to invasions and urges that they
be so regarded,40 while another authority asserts that the airways should
be considered as a res communis omnium, free for any lawful purpose.'
As of this writing, there appears to be no ruling precedent or universally
accepted doctrine which would clarify such matters as the allocation of
the burden of proof concerning whether the broadcast was intended only
for local distribution. Attempts to adopt a multilateral convention de-
fining the obligations of nations in regard to this have not been success-
ful, and for that reason an important part of the law defining "legiti-
mate" rebellion continues to be obscure.
IV. CONVENTIONAL LAW REGARDING LOCALIZATION OF REBELLION
Thus far, little attention has been given to the efforts by states to
achieve "localization" of rebellion, which is an essential element of due
process of rebellion. There are, however, many agreements of varying
degrees of binding force through which states have attempted to pre-
serve the internal character of rebellions. Of primary importance, per-
haps, is the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted on November 17, 1950, under the title "Peace Through Deeds."
This convention
reaffirms that, whatever the weapons used, any aggression,
whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the
interest of a foreign power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all
crimes against peace and security throughout the world. 2
39. Van Dyke, The Responsibility of States for International Propaganda, 34 AM. J. INT'L
L. 58 (1940).
40. Fenwick, The Use of the Radio as an Instrument of Foreign Propaganda, 32 AM. J. INT'L
L. 339 (1938).
41. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Propaganda by Governments, 13 TRANS. GROT. SOC. 143
(1928).
42. G.A. Res. 380 (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/ 1775 (1950).
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However, as previously noted, much of the relevant law needed to deter-
mine whether, for example, a broadcast is aggressive in character is
nonexistent. To the extent that the Resolution refers to the traditional
forms of "aggression," it is merely declarative of the pre-existing inter-
national law. The Resolution of 1950 adds little, therefore, to the earlier
Resolution, "Essentials of Peace,"' 3 which called upon states to refrain
43. G.A. Res. 290 (IV) (1949). The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the
United Nations states inter alia:
[T]he strict observance by States of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any
other State is an essential condition to assure that nations live together in peace with one
another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter
of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international
peace and security. . . .No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements,
are in violation of international law. . . . No State may use or encourage the use of
economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
obtain from it subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of
the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970).
In view of the above declaration of principles, the following excerpts from Vicker, The Ideol-
ogy of Black September, Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1972, at 12, are instructive:
"Violence will purify the individuals from venom; it will redeem the colonized from
inferiority complex; it will return courage to the countryman."
So says a pamphlet printed by Al Fatah, the militant wing of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, the catchall organization which will engage unceasing war on Israelis and
on anybody else who might get in the way. The definition of the "enemy" is extremely
broad and could cover just about everybody except an ultra-radical Maoist in the eyes of
a particularly radical Al Fatah branch, such as the Black September Movement, which is
claiming responsibility for the slaughter of the II Israelis at the Olympic games.
Some of the statements voiced by Al Fatah come straight from Frantz Fanon, the
radical writer who has inspired a whole generation of guerrillas to believe that violence
purifies the soul. Ho Chi Minh, Che Guervara and Mao are its heroes. Al Fatah's aims
are total revolution, not only against Israel but against the whole capitalist system ...
"Victory will be achieved by the masses," declared an intense young Iraqi recently
on the campus of the American University of Beirut ...
"In the political struggle, any weapon is a valid weapon as long as it is in the hands
of the people," the spokesman continued. He made it clear that this included plane
hijacking, sabotage, bombing or anything else which fitted the plans of Arab guerri-
las. .. .
Ironically, guerrilla raids like that at the Olympics in Munich illustrate frustration
more than success for the anti-Israeli underground. Israel's success in protecting its bor-
ders makes activity within that country a risky matter indeed. So strikes have developed
far from the focal point of battle in the Mideast.
Such guerrilla tactics are difficult to prevent. Police forces just aren't big enough
except in police states in the socialist world to protect every installation, every plane and
every domicile against isolated acts of violence. . ..
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from "fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any
state."
It is unfortunate that a more precise concern for the present day
meaning of the crime of abetting internal strife was not shown by the
General Assembly. The issue is of more than academic importance. In
considering the approval of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article V, which
deals with the question of armed attack on the signatories, the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was presented with exactly this
problem. The Committee concluded:
Obviously, purely internal disorders or revolutions would not
be considered "armed attacks" within the meaning of Article
V. However, if a revolution were aided and abetted by an
outside power such assistance might possibly be considered an
armed attack.4
The report further states that each case must be considered on its own
merits, which is, of course, tantamount to a refusal to propose a clarify-
ing rule.
Other attempts have been made to formalize the obligations of
states with regard to what might be considered the problem of preserv-
ing the territorial integrity of revolution. Article VII of the Convention
on Territorial Asylum, signed in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 28,
1954, provides that:
Freedom of expression of thought, recognized by domestic
law for all inhabitants of a State, may not be grounds of com-
plaint by a third State on the basis of opinions expressed pub-
licly against it or its government by asylees or refugees, except
when these concepts constitute systematic propaganda through
which they incite to the use of force or violence against the
government of the complaining State.45
While seven states have ratified this agreement, the United States has
not, and the ratification of this or a similar protocol presents another
area in which immediate measures may be undertaken to strengthen the
international law guaranteeing due process of rebellion.
Those guerrillas of the future are apt to be even more deadly than those of today.
For if violence remains their credo, they probably will be equipped with weapons much
more advanced than those in the hands of today's Fedayeen.
For further comment on the Olympic incident, see TIME, September 18, 1972, at 22.
44. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY, S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949).
45. U.N. CONVENTION ON TERRITORIAL ASYLUM, TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE,
REPORT OF THE DELEGATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 176-78 (1954).
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The United States has not, by means of any binding agreement,
clarified its position with regard to the fomenting of civil strife through
propaganda. The United States is signatory to an agreement formaliz-
ing the dominant international law pertaining to a state's duty to refrain
from permitting armed attack to be launched from its territory. That
document was signed in Havana, Cuba, on February 20, 1928, and is
commonly called the Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the
Event of Civil Strife. As of 1965, each of the 21 American republics,
with the exceptions of Chile, Guatemala and Venezuela, had ratified this
Convention, which provides in part that the contracting parties shall use
all means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of their
territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in, gathering
elements, crossing the boundary, or sailing from their territory
for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife."
Other Articles of this Convention bind the contracting parties to disarm
rebel forces crossing their boundaries and to forbid any traffic in arms,
at least until the rebellious force has been recognized.
Big powers, guided by considerations of national self-interest, have
often found it necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of other
nations. The United States has often been so involved. As Quincy
Wright observed:
The United States has been involved in civil strife on some
200 occasions if one includes minor incidents on its own terri-
tory such as Shay's Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, Nat
Turner's Rebellion, the Seminole War, the Black Hawk War
and other Indian hostilities; and interventions in civil strife,
often to assure free elections, in foreign countries such as Nica-
ragua, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Samoa, China, Russia, Lebanon, and others, as well as six
greater wars: the American Revolution, in which the United
States fought for its own self-determination; the Civil War in
which it fought to frustrate the self-determination of the Con-
federacy; the Spanish-American War in which it fought to
assure self-determination for Cuba; the Philippine insurrec-
tion in which it fought to frustrate self-determination; and wars
in Korea and Viet Nam, in which it is controversial whether it
has fought for self-determination of the southern half of these
46. Rights and Duties of States in Event of Civil Strife, Feb. 20, 1928, art I, para. 1, 46
Stat. 2749 (1928), T.S. 814 (effective May 21, 1929).
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countries or to frustrate self-determination of the whole.,7
The United States commitment to nonintervention in the Western
Hemisphere is an obvious example of noncompliance with a well-
established norm.4 8 When the Latin American colonies struggled for
independence in the early 19th century, the United States' policy in-
cluded the granting of de facto recognition to exclude European influ-
ence from the hemisphere. This was followed by the Monroe Doctrine
in 1823. The United States first began to interfere in the internal affairs
of these nations in the 1880's with the professed contemplation of exca-
vating a canal to link the Pacific and Atlantic. The goal was to control
the Caribbean, a policy which in part led to the Spanish-American War
and armed intervention in Cuba's struggle for independence. Control of
the Caribbean area was facilitated by the establishment of a system of
protectorates in which the United States intervened both militarily and
diplomatically. In most cases armed intervention took place subject to
treaty arrangements such as the Platt Amendment with regard to Cuba.
There were, however, instances, such as uprisings in the Dominican
Republic and Haiti, in which the United States intervened without legal
justification. Woodrow Wilson unsuccessfully attempted to eliminate
the intervention policy. His Pan American Pact was essentially an effort
to multilateralize the Monroe Doctrine and to establish multilateral
machinery for intervention in Mexico. When this failed, Wilson, fearing
German influence, attempted to manipulate support for the candidates
of his choice in the Mexican leadership struggle. Later his primary
concern was to maintain stability. Between World Wars I and II, Euro-
pean influence was minimal; thus, more respect could be given to terri-
torial integrity. There were interventions in Nicaragua and Honduras
which resulted from previous treaty commitments to the existing re-
gimes. At the Montevideo Conference in 1933, the United States com-
mitted itself to the principle of nonintervention and by 1941 had elimi-
nated all of its protectorates and its interventionary rights (excepting
Panama).
With the threat of World War II in the late 1930's, the principle
of nonintervention was greatly strained. More subtle means were ap-
plied to assure stability of various Latin American governments.
Through American military missions, arms were distributed in order to
influence the Latin American military establishments. Efforts were
47. Wright, International Law and the American Civil War, 61 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L.
50 (1967).
48. Kane, American Involvement in Latin American Civil Strife, 61 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L
L. 58 (1967).
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made to counteract German and Italian influence and thereby bind the
military to American influence. The military missions put a cover of
respectability over functions which had formerly been undertaken by the
marines. Military bases were obtained by utilizing Pan American Air-
ways as a negotiating front. Prior to World War II, actual civil strife
in Latin America was rare; the War of Independence, the Cuban Revo-
lutions of 1868 and 1895, and the Mexican Revolution in 1910 were
exceptions. Most political instability was merely an intra-elite struggle
of factions or individuals seeking control and was quickly concluded
with little loss of life or property. Rarely was United States intervention
consciously designed to assure the victory of one side or the other. Its
purpose was to end situations which endangered the life and property
of American citizens and to abate conditions which could eventually
produce non-American intervention in the Western Hemisphere. A con-
stant search was undertaken for alternatives to intervention. The Latin
American doctrine of complete nonintervention failed to account for the
needs of hemispheric security. With the absence of multilateral alterna-
tives, the strict nonintervention principle had to be abandoned. As one
commentator states:
International law has played an ambivalent role in Latin
American civil strife and American involvement in it. Early in
the War of Independence confusion over the status of colonial
insurgents resulted on the one hand in their continued access
to American weapons markets after Spain had been excluded,
and on the other, in their slaughter by the Spaniards as traitors
to the Crown. International standards of government recogni-
tion were pitifully inadequate to deal with the emerging consti-
tutional government. U.S. non-compliance with traditional
norms amounted to needed legislation rather than violation.
International authorization of intervention for pecuniary
claims led to an asymmetrical legal situation that was a con-
stant threat to American security in the early years of the 20th
century. American intervention was a unilateral attempt to
correct that asymmetry. By traditional norms, U.S. interven-
tion in cases not involving treaties was "illegal." In effect this
was just one aspect of the outmoded special concepts of tradi-
tional international law. This same criticism can, in fact, be
made of the later principle of nonintervention. Limitations of
intervention from the Kellogg Pact to the U.N. Charter simply
fail to contemplate the transnational location of vital interests.
But it is important to note that the international legal system
did prove flexible enough to accept radically novel claims from
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both the United States and the Latin American countries.4 9
In the post World War II period, the United States emerged as the
dominant national power to challenge the spread of Soviet and, later,
Chinese influence. Though this challenge has many of the aspects of
traditional big power rivalry, there is also an ideological element which
is revolutionary in nature and affects the structure of the international
legal order.50 The Russian Revolution has, like the earlier French Revo-
lution, transcended national boundaries and affected the established
institutions of other states. The situation is similar to that which faced
Europe after the French Revolution. With the Declaration of Pilnitz in
1791, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia pledged them-
selves to restore the French monarchy by joint force." The Holy Alli-
ance and the Protocol of Troppau in 1820 asserted the policy of Euro-
pean monarchies, as led by Metternich, to oppose the revolutionary
upheavals of established governments. The Truman Doctrine and
American policy after World War II reflect a similar policy. On the
other hand, the revolutionary justifies the use of violence and interven-
tion as a means to defend against what he regards as a threat to his
position, to rectify long standing grievances, and to proliferate what he
considers the universal values of his ideology. Within this context, inter-
nal strife becomes readily subjected to external intervention."
The United States has committed itself to stop revolution. 3 The
pattern was established by the Truman Doctrine, under which the
United States intervened in Greece to defend the monarchy from an
army of Communist-led insurgents. Intervention may be by military
means or by other methods such as economic aid or psychological sup-
port.5 4 After the intervention in Greece, the United States again inter-
vened militarily in Lebanon in 1958 when, in response to a telegram
from President Chamoun, a contingent of 14,000 marines was dis-
patched to help defend against revolutionary activity instigated by
Egypt and Iraq.5 The marines were subsequently withdrawn after the
internal conflict was resolved. In 1965, in response to a report by the
American ambassador that American lives were in danger, marines
49. Id. at 69.
50. Barnet, United States Involvement in Foreign Civil Strife since World War I1, 61 PROC.
AM. Soc. INT'L L. 69 (1967).
51. Falk, World Revolution and International Order, in REVOLUTION, NOMOS VIII 154
(Friedrich ed. 1966).
52. Id. at 155.
53. Id. at 160-65.
54. Barnet, supra note 50, at 70.
55. Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
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landed in the Dominican Republic to stem a revolution and arrange a
political settlement compatible with the interests of the United States.
In this case, there was no outside instigation of the revolt.5"
The Soviet Union also intervened in Hungary in 1956, justifying its
action before the United Nations by claiming that it acted at the request
of the de facto government. The United States has subsequently justified
its intervention in Viet Nam with a similar argument. 7 Likewise, the
United States attempted to justify its intervention in the Dominican
Republic by claiming that it acted at the request of the ruling military
junta.5 8 Indeed, a permissible ground for intervention by a state in an-
other's internal strife is an invitation from the de jure government.
However, in order to determine the legitimacy of such requests for
military assistance, it is necessary to decide whether the government
making the request is in a position to represent the state. 59 A govern-
ment in firm possession of the territory of a state may speak for it even
if not generally recognized."0 There is also a presumption that a govern-
ment, even if generally recognized, cannot speak for the state if it is not
in firm possession of the territory of the state. However, if the de facto
government of a territory has been established by aggression, the de jure
government continues to have a rightful claim to the territory. But the
situation is different where the de jure government has lost authority by
virtue of internal revolt.6 Text writers have held that in case of rebellion,
insurrection or civil war, neither faction may speak in the name of the
state as long as the outcome remains uncertain. The United Nations
Charter, as an aspect of the principle of self-determination, permits
revolution. Therefore, where America has intervened after World War
II, the question arises, from a legal standpoint, whether intervention was
56. Barnet, supra note 50, at 71.
57. The similarity between the American and Soviet argument for justifying intervention is
noted with extensive quotations by J. LASLEY, MY COUNTRY RIGHT OR WRONG? 44-50 (1966).
Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union justified its interventionist
policy by the formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The doctrine in effect asserts that socialist
countries have a special international status which limits their sovereignty, not entitling them to
rely on the U.N. Charter or norms of international law for their defense. The socialist countries
are forbidden to execute political, economic or social reforms without the consent of the Soviet
Union. That which is regarded as a threat to socialism is apt to evoke Soviet intervention; the
Soviet Communist Party is the ultimate determinant of what constitutes a threat to socialism.
Therefore, the legal head of a socialist government is a mere fiction. On the international level,
legal rules are ignored. As formulated, the Brezhnev Doctrine extends beyond the satellite countries
to any situation regarded by the Soviet Union as a threat to socialism. Romaniecki, Sources of
the Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty and Intervention, 5 Is. L. REv. 527 (1970).
58. J. LASLEY, MY COUNTRY RIGHT OR WRONG? 44-50 (1966).
59. Wright, supra note 55, at 119.
60. Id.
61. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 94, at 347 (8th ed. 1924).
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at the request of a de jure government in actual control of a state's
territory. Applying these principles, the United States may be said to
have intervened legally in Greece, but some doubt exists as to how much
control President Chamoun's government retained in Lebanon. In the
Dominican Republic, it is quite apparent that the de jure military junta
lacked de facto authority when inviting American intervention. In Viet
Nam, the de facto authority of the government of South Viet Nam was
in some dispute in that a considerable part of the territory was under
the control of the Viet Cong and a series of coups had occurred in
Saigon.
Intervention without legal invitation may constitute aggression.
Article 2, Paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter requires all
members to refrain from the threat or use of armed force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. However,
armed force may be justified in exercising the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense under Article 51 or under the authority of
the United Nations or another competent international body. Interven-
tion in the form of military reprisals to rectify wrongs when peaceful
methods fail, while permissible by international law before World War
I, has been forbidden by conventional obligations in the League Cove-
nant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter. 2 If an
intervention means exercising self-defense, a determination must be
made as to what constitutes "self." Clearly, a state may act in self-
defense if an armed attack upon its territory occurs; this could also
encompass the threat of an armed attack. But such threats must consti-
tute an immediate danger of armed attack. The "self" might be ex-
tended to include not only territory but also agencies of the government
and its citizens in foreign territory.13 Intervention could be limited to
defense only and might not be expanded to permit a prolonged occupa-
tion or an expansion of territory. The particular state involved makes
the initial determination with the ultimate determination being made by
the Security Council. The right of self-defense also includes the right to
collective self-defense; thus, a state may give military assistance to an-
other state which is threatened or subject to armed attack. Such inter-
vention, even under a collective defense treaty, requires a specific re-
quest. Often it is difficult to determine whether a government is in a
position to make such a request. The determination of whether a partic-
ular intervention is legal involves a consideration of many complex
62. Wright, supra notes 47 and 55; Wright, Intervention and Cuba in 1961, 55 PROC. AM.
Soc. INT'L L. 2 (1961).
63. Id.
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factors. Quincy Wright has taken the position that a state is not permit-
ted to intervene militarily even on invitation of another government
unless the need has arisen chiefly because of foreign intervention, and
that such a state must abstain from aiding either faction during a situa-
tion of domestic strife." However, Professor Moore contends that a
particular intervention is legally permissible if conducive to interna-
tional public order.6 5
The military intervention in the Dominican Republic was under-
taken unilaterally by the United States allegedly to protect the lives of
American citizens in the course of an armed uprising. Later the United
States claimed that the rebels had been infiltrated by Communists and
Castroites. 61 The Organization of American States, acting through its
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs under Article
39 of the Charter and subsequently through its Organ of Consultation,
called for a cease fire and the orderly evacuation of foreign nationals.
The O.A.S. created a five man committee to carry out an on-the-spot
investigation. Subsequently, the Organization formed an inter-
American armed force (under a unified command) which incorporated
the United States forces already in the Dominican Republic. Its sole
purpose was to cooperate
in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Re-
public, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the
inviolability of human rights and in the establishment of an
atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the func-
tioning of democratic institutions. 7
The action could have been justified legally as an action initiated to
prevent a Communist take-over; a resolution of the Tenth Inter-
American Conference adopted in 1965 asserted that the domination or
control of the government of an American state by the "international
Communist movement" would constitute a threat to the peace and
would call for the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with
existing treaties. The wide competence of the Organ of Consultation
under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty would have justified the occupation
of the island by an inter-American armed force despite the terms of
Article 17, which prohibit intervention in internal affairs. But the neces-
64. Id.
65. Discussion, 61 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 79 (1967). Moore, The Lawfulness of Military
Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1967).
66. Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self Defense, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 64 (1966).
67. 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 988 (1965).
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sary two-thirds vote was not garnered for such a statement. To come
under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, the justification offered by the Reso-
lution must fall within the provision "any other fact or situation endan-
gering peace." The Meeting of Ministers might regard the extreme
measures taken by both sides as a threat to peace. A dictatorship estab-
lished by the dominant faction might raise the question of the inviolabil-
ity of human rights. Some of the representatives feared that action by
the Meeting of Consultation would be a precedent for intervention in
other possible civil wars, while the majority felt that the case, because
of its urgency, must be judged on its own merits."8 Clearly, civil strife
can be brought under the control of inter-American regional law only
insofar as a threat to the general peace is involved. There is no sanction
regarding the violation of fundamental human rights although such a
sanction might be inferred where the gravity of the situation constitutes
a threat to the general peace.
The American involvement in Viet Nam has been subjected to
extensive debate. The official position is that the Viet Cong are agents
of the North Vietnamese government and that South Viet Nam is being
subjected to external aggression." However, there is evidence that the
conflict has many internal aspects.70 The problem is to develop proce-
dures to determine whether foreign participation in an internal war
constitutes "military assistance," "intervention," "aggression," or an
"armed attack." In assessing intervention in Viet Nam, it is also impor-
tant to consider whether North and South Viet Nam are, in fact, sepa-
rate states or part of one state. This depends on a consideration as to
the effect of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and subsequent interna-
tional behavior. The fact that the two states have been recognized diplo-
matically and are treated internationally as separate entities might give
some support to the view that they are indeed different legal entities.
The Viet Nam conflict has undoubtedly created some unfortunate pre-
cedents in international law because of the unilateral nature of United
States involvement and the extension of the war to the North.7'
68. Fenwick, supra note 66.
69. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, The Legality of the United States
Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085 (1966).
70. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J.
1122 (1966); other legal writings include: Moore, International Law and the United States Role
in Viet Nam: A Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051 (1967); Falk, International Law and the United States
Role in Viet Nam: A Response to Professor Moore, 76 YALE L.J. 1095 (1967); Moore & Under-
wood (in collaboration with McDougal), The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Repub-
lic of Viet Nam, 112 CONG. REC. 14 (daily ed. July 14, 1966); Standard, United States Intervention
in Vietnam Is Not Legal, 52 A.B.A.J. 627 (1966); Moore, supra note 65.
71. Falk, supra note 70.
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Intervention need not be accomplished directly by the armed forces
of another state. There has been resort to unconventional warfare, i.e.,
guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, and the conduct of subversion
against hostile states in wartime.72 Unconventional warfare has been
used as an aspect of internal strife.7" At the same time, it has become
a weapons system of the hot and cold wars to achieve political and
military goals.74 The Soviet Union's leaders have recognized that tradi-
tional warfare with its classical armies has become unfeasible as a
means for promoting world revolution, and, thus, peaceful coexistence
has been accepted as a basic principle of Soviet policy. The struggle for
revolution has, nonetheless, been delegated to the Communist Party,
which stands above the government and engages in support of unconven-
tional warfare. The Communists have supported nationalist liberation
movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America with the hope of eventu-
ally obtaining control. To counter this tactic, the United States has
adopted a policy of counter-insurgency which has led to involvement in
internal strife.
The United States has engaged in unconventional warfare through
the Central Intelligence Agency's interference in internal affairs of
states extensively during the past twenty years.75 For example, in 1953,
the United States arranged a coup in Iran to overthrow Mohammed
Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The
following year, the United States, with the personal participation of
Ambassador John Peurifoy, secretly arranged an invasion of Guatemala
by two hundred men who had been trained by the Central Intelligence
Agency in Honduras and Nicaragua. The purpose of the invasion was
to overthrow President Arbenz who had expropriated plantations from
the United Fruit Company and appointed persons thought to be Com-
munists to leading positions in the ministries of education, propaganda
and agriculture. In 1961, a group of Cuban refugees, with the support
of the Central Intelligence Agency, attempted an invasion of Cuba at
the Bay of Pigs.7" In numerous coups, United States intervention was
much more subtle. Though the United States may not actually inter-
72. Yarborough, Unconventional Warfare: One Military View, in Zawodny,
Unconventional Warefare, 341 ANNALS 1 (1962). See generally R. THOMPSON, REVOLUTIONARY
WAR IN WORLD STRATEGY, 1945-1969 (1970).
73. Knorr, Unconventional Warfare: Strategy and Tactics in Internal Political Strife, in
Zawodny, Unconventional Warfare, 341 ANNALS 53 (1962).
74. Bjelajac, Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches, in Zawodny,
Unconventional Warfare, 341 ANNALS 74 (1962).
75. Barnet, supra note 50, at 72.
76. Wright, Intervention and Cuba in 1961, 55 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 2 (1961).
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vene, its inaction, because of its pervasive influence, is in itself a form
of intervention.77 In many cases, the United States manifested an atti-
tude of either covert support for, or acquiescence in, the change of
government in a manner which helped the insurgents.
Where a military dictatorship without ties or allegiance to the
Communist Party overturned the preceding regime, the United States
generally has either been neutral or maintained friendly support, al-
though it has participated in an insurgent operation against the non-
Communist Trujillo and Diem regimes. Though the United States has
assisted authoritarian regimes in Latin America, it has also helped non-
Communist leftist revolutionaries in Algeria and other parts of Africa.
On occasion, the State Department and the C.I.A. have supported op-
posing factions, as in Laos in 1961 and in the Dominican Republic in
1962. Though the United States has militarily followed the rule that it
is legal to aid the incumbent government but not the insurgents (e.g., in
Viet Nam), it has implicitly rejected this approach in its covert opera-
tions (e.g., in Iran). Another rule the United States has followed is the
legitimization of outside participation on one side or the other, depend-
ing upon the power position of the factions. Thus, when the rebels
achieve certain characteristics of government, they may be aided. This
is a difficult rule to apply, as the relative positions of the contenders for
recognition change from day to day.
Another aspect of intervention in internal strife is the struggle
against colonialism. The Organization of African Unity has conducted
a campaign of armed intervention by lending support to liberation
movements in dependent African territories.78 This organization of Afri-
can states has clearly threatened to use force against colonial powers
and states practicing segregation (e.g., South Africa). The United Na-
tions has on a number of occasions clearly condemned support for
armed bands, as in Greece.79 The activities of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity clearly fall within this category. However, the African states
regard their actions as lawful. African leaders at the Addis Ababa Con-
77. R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 10 (1968).
78. Dugard, The Organisation of African Unity and Colonialism: An Enquiry into the Plea
of Self-Defense as a Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism, 16 INT'L
AND COMP. L.Q. 157 (1967).
79. G.A. Res. 380 (V). The actions of the African States are in clear violation of the
Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Pro-
tection of their Independence and Sovereignty of December 21, 1965, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), which
declares that no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist
or armed activities toward the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil
strife in another state and also condemns colonialism and racial discrimination. The Organization
of African Unity activity clearly involves the support for armed bands.
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ference in 1963 equated the struggle against colonialism with self-
defense. Though African states have complained to the Security Council
that the arms build-ups in the Portuguese territories, Rhodesia and
South Africa represent a threat to the security of Africa, the increase
in armaments in these territories may also be regarded as a defensive
measure to counter the threat of the Organization of African Unity-a
position asserted by the colonial powers.
It is doubtful whether the colonial powers would militarily attack
the independent African states. The Charter of the United Nations does
not outlaw colonialism and may even recognize its legality. But recently,
particularly with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples,0 there has been considerable support
for the position that colonialism is an international wrong which should
be eradicated by international intervention. The view had been advanced
that colonialism is a form of continuing aggression which may be elimi-
nated by the use of force in the exercise of the right of self-defense. India
attempted to justify its invasion of Portuguese-held Goa on the ground
that Portugal's presence constituted a continuing aggression which had
been commenced 450 years before. The Security Council refused to
accept this argument. Moreover, unlike Goa, the African territories do
not form an integral geographical and historical part of another state.
Another concept which justifies intervention is that of self-defense
against colonial domination or the exercise of the right of self-
determination; however, this concept has nothing to do with self-defense
as encompassed by Article 51 of the Charter. The element of an "ag-
gressor state" is lacking. Nevertheless, a legal right to decolonization
has been deduced from United Nations practice. This practice envisages
the elimination of colonialism by peaceful persuasion rather than by
armed force.
Another approach has been to assert the right of intervention on
behalf of kith and kin, a concept adapted from the right to intervene to
protect nationals."' The Egyptian government attempted to justify its
intervention in Palestine in 1948 by claiming it was entering to protect
the Arab inhabitants with whom it claimed to have special ties. The
Jewish authorities raised the same plea to justify their activities outside
of Palestine. In 1961, a similar argument was raised by India to justify
her annexation of Goa. The November 1964 operation of the United
States and Belgium in Stanleyville to rescue Americans and Europeans,
80. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV).
81. Dugard, supra note 78, at 171.
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justified on humanitarian grounds, was criticized by the Africans as a
move to protect whites. But this may be the safest justification for the
use of force against colonial powers. A trend has developed recognizing
the right to protect racial, religious, linguistic or cultural kith and kin.
India has protested the maltreatment of people of Indian origin in South
Africa even though they are citizens of South Africa. A moral obliga-
tion is asserted. Similarly, in the Cyprus conflict, Greece and Turkey
claimed the right to protect those inhabitants related to them by reli-
gious and cultural ties. Another example is the Eichmann trial in which
a nexus was claimed between the Jewish people and the State of Israel.
But it is doubtful if such a right is encompassed by Article 51, and the
concept is subject to abuse. There is little support among writers for this
concept. On the other hand, means must be available for the enforce-
ment of United Nations Charter provisions for the protection of human
rights and the right of self-determination when the United Nations fails
to take action. Considerations of humanity form the ultimate basis of
the right of self-defense in protection of a state's nationals. The principle
may thus be extended to the protection of kith and kin. For intervention
on this basis there must be an imminent threat of injury to the peoples
to be protected. The intervention must be solely for the purpose of
protection, and once this is achieved, the intervening state is obliged to
withdraw. Any such action must be reported to the Security Council.
The activities of the Organization of African Unity in seeking to eradi-
cate colonialism go beyond these limitations, but, because the ends of
the Organization are generally approved, its means are unlikely to be
condemned.
A continuing problem of internal strife is that outside intervention
may lead to situations threatening international peace. This was quite
apparent in the Spanish Civil War when a large number of European
states asserted a policy of noninterference and sought to restrict the
shipment of arms. Nevertheless, Germany and Italy actively intervened
to assist the rebel Nationalist Army while the Soviet Union sent techni-
cians and other assistance to the loyalist Republican forces. The whole
system, based on the good faith cooperation of the states involved,
proved ineffectual in avoiding intervention.8 1
In the Congo, the United Nations actively intervened to forestall
intervention by individual powers and, thereby, to insulate the conflict
from cold war confrontation.83 The causes and features of this interven-
82. Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 61 PRoc. AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 2 (1967).
83. Hoffman, In Search of a Threat: The U.N. in the Congo Labyrinth, in N. PADELFORD
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tion were complex. Following independence, Congolese troops revolted
and Belgium intervened by sending in its forces. The Congolese govern-
ment requested United Nations aid. The Security Council deemed the
situation a threat to the peace and authorized the sending of United
Nations contingents. The precise legal basis for the intervention is un-
clear; the original aim was the restoration of order and the withdrawal
of Belgian troops. The U.N. force was authorized to prevent outside
interference in the Congo but was barred from intervening in the
Congo's internal conflicts. Following the entry of the U.N. force, the
province of Katanga sought to secede, and the role of the United Na-
tions, therefore, became more complex. Secretary General Hammar-
skjold took the position that the United Nations' role was to preserve
order in Katanga but that the Congolese forces were not to accompany
the U.N. forces in the seceding province. The Secretary General made
an attempt to separate the political function of the U.N. from concilia-
tion. Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese Premier, sought Soviet help but
was later ousted and his government collapsed. The U.N. role then
proved even more inadequate. The avoidance of civil war became the
prime objective, which proved incompatible with the policy of not inter-
vening in internal conflicts. The U.N.'s closing of the radio station and
airport in Leopoldville to prevent a popular uprising kept Lumumba
from regaining power and preventing the arrest of Lumumba by Joseph
Mobutu's men both constituted forms of intervention. The United Na-
tions thus found itself faced with a dilemma. Without a central govern-
ment, order could not be preserved. A breakdown in the consensus of
the United Nations operation occurred when the Soviet Union vetoed
a Security Council proposal to widen the United Nations' role in the
Congo. The matter was then transferred to the General Assembly where
an inconclusive attempt was made to determine the legal authorities in
the Congo. The U.N. representatives in the Congo tried to reconcile the
opposing Congolese factions, but only ended on bad terms with every
faction as a result. To many Asian and African nations and the Soviet
Union, Lumumba represented the legitimate government while the
Western nations supported Kasavubu. After Lumumba was assassi-
nated, the Security Council urged that the Congolese parliament be
reconvened and empowered the U.N. to use its forces as a last resort
to prevent civil war. Reconciliation of the factions involving the central
government was arranged, but the problem of the seceding Katanga
province remained. U.N. forces arrested two hundred mercenaries at
Elizabethville; when the U.N. sought to arrest others two weeks later,
& R. EMERSON, AFRICA AND WORLD ORDER 63 (1963); McNemar, The Post Independence War
in the Congo, 61 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 13 (1967); Schachter, Legal Aspects of the United
Nations Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1967).
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armed conflict ensued. The principle of nonintervention was abandoned.
Finally, the U.N. forces withdrew from the Congo; the central govern-
ment was intact and the Katanga secession ended.
The U.N. intervention pre-empted unilateral military assistance to
opposing factions. Military assistance had been given previously to op-
posing factions by Belgium and the Soviet Union. A unanimous General
Assembly resolution (with the Soviet Union, France and Belgium ab-
staining) asserted the international norm of noninterference. The United
Nations withdrew after determining that the danger of big power mili-
tary confrontation had ended. But the U.N. did become involved in the
conflict, despite Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter which forbids the
U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state. Secretary General Hammarskjold, attempting a
cautious approach, tried to limit the U.N. involvement by allowing the
people to decide freely their own government. Nev.ertheless, a big power
polarization did occur and hindered U.N. efforts. The U.N. was en-
gaged in a difficult and thankless task and met with such disapproval
from many of its members that a financial crisis resulted from its inter-
vention.
Although the norm of nonintervention and the right of national
self-determination is constantly reasserted by statesmen and texts on
international law, the interdependence of international society makes
intervention in internal conflicts inevitable. The problem is to minimize
such intervention so that nations may be able to master their own fates.
At the same time, possible big power confrontations which can cause a
threat must be avoided. The ability of the United Nations to function
as an instrument to insulate unilateral intervention is frustrated by the
realities of international rivalry.
Big power rivalry, as in the Middle East, has made a mockery of
the international legal norms. 4 Internal and regional conflicts are ex-
ploited to serve big power interests. The peoples affected must assert
themselves by seeking the establishment of international norms to per-
mit them to determine the nature of their societies. These norms may
be implemented through Security Council and General Assembly reso-
lutions and buttressed by the establishment of an ad hoc or permanent
International War Crimes Tribunal which could be empowered to hear
and make determinations as to the legality of acts of intervention. The
precedent for the establishment of such a tribunal is to be found in the
84. In the Middle East, both the Soviet Union and the United States have actively exploited
the Arab-Israeli differences as well as internal strife within the Arab states in order to promote
their own interests and to seek domination of the region. Scheer, The Nasser Thesis, RAMPARTS,
Nov. 1967 and Jan. 1968.
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Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. Individuals and groups who believe
themselves to be adversely affected by acts of outside intervention would
be permitted to file complaints. The tribunal would be able to make an
impartial determination as to the legality of the act of intervention,
whether it be by conventional or unconventional warfare or by other
means.
In this context, it should be noted that the big powers have, in the
past, sought to limit their involvement in big power conflicts by develop-
ing certain rules of the game. The world powers seek to avoid the
escalation of small wars beyond certain thresholds. One such rule, for
example, is the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons." These rules
might be judicially developed by an ad hoc or permanent international
tribunal.
V. RECOGNITION
When a government is created through civil strife, the international
community becomes involved through the process of recognition. 6
When a government gains authority legitimately, foreign states auto-
matically accord it recognition; however, in the case of a coup d'etat,
opportunity sometimes arises to delay or refuse recognition. The reac-
tions of foreign powers may be an important, and sometimes crucial,
problem which conspirators of coups must face. 7 However, many coups
d'etat have occurred in which the usurpers have not had to seek recogni-
tion. A recognition problem emerges only when the office traditionally
accredited to receive foreign representatives is unoccupied or when a
new body claims the right. For example, Mussolini, after coming to
power, did not have to seek foreign recognition because he left the
existing monarchy intact,"' allowing it to continue receiving the foreign
diplomats.
85. Falk, New Approaches to the Study of International Law, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 484
(1967); McWhinney, Soviet and Western International Law and the Cold War in the Era of
Bipolarity, I CAN. Y.B. INT'L LAW 40 (1963).
86. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 117, 219ff., 368ff., 372 (1945).
87. See generally S. GOODSPEED, THE CONSPIRATORS, A STUDY OF THE CouP D'ETAT
(1961).
88. Rapoport. Coup d'Etat: The View of the Men Firing Pistols, in REVOLUTION, NOMOS
ViII 53, 57 (Friedrich ed. 1966).
The United States withheld recognition of the Greek regime following an attempted coup by
King Constantine to overthrow the military government, but after six weeks State Department
spokesman Robert J. McClosky stated in announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations that:
The United States continues to regard King Constantine as the Greek chief of
state-relations between the King and the Government in Athens are an internal Greek
matter, about which it is not for the United States Government to comment.
New York Times, Jan. 24, 1968, at I, 8. This position was taken even though the King had fled
his country.
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The term "recognition" has been applied both to the recognition
of states and to the recognition of governments. The problem with
regard to the former has arisen with the breaking up of other states or
colonial empires." A new state comes into existence when a community
acquires the following characteristics: (1) an organized government, (2)
a defined territory, and (3) such a degree of independence from control
by another state as to be capable of conducting its own international
relations.9 0 Whether a new state has actually begun to exist is a question
of fact to be determined by every other state. This determination may
be difficult, especially when part of an existing state is endeavoring to
secede forcibly from the rest. In such a case, a premature recognition
would be an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of that
state, while nonrecognition may also constitute a form of intervention,
such as in the secession of Biafra from Nigeria. Nonrecognition of a new
state is normally concomitant with acknowledgment that the territory
thereof is rightfully within the sovereignty of a third power so that the
conflict is one of factions.
The major traditional doctrines of recognition are the constitutive
and the declaratory doctrines. The constitutive doctrine holds that a
state becomes an international person only and exclusively through rec-
ognition. Hence, a new state may acquire rights and duties in interna-
tional law only when recognized by other states.9 The constitutive
theory has been criticized as logically unsound and morally objectiona-
ble. A new state would exist as to states which recognized it but not as
to those states which did not, thereby creating a problem in the legal
system as to practical relationships. Furthermore, the recognition of
governments cannot be dealt with on the same footing as the recognition
of states, as governments cannot be "constituted" by the recognizing
state, though they can be admitted to the rights possessed by the pre-
existing state. The constitutive theory is morally objectionable in that
nonrecognition of a state would mean that its citizens would not be
afforded the protection of international law.
Opposite this theory is the declaratory approach. This approach
holds that international law is an objective system which dictates the
conditions under which a state becomes a member of the international
community so that the rights and duties of a state remain independent
89. Comment, Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 857 (1967).
90. J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE 136 (Waldock ed.1963).
91. Comment, supra note 89, at 860; J. BRIERLY, supra note 90, at 138.
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of formal recognition.92 A state may exist without being recognized; if
it exists in fact, irrespective of whether it has been formally recognized
by other states, it has a right to be treated by them as a state. Under
this theory, the function of recognition is to acknowledge as a fact
something which was uncertain-the independence of the body claiming
to be a state-and to accept the usual courtesies of international inter-
course.
93
The recognition of a state implies the acceptance by one state of
another into the legal framework of international law. The recognition
of a government, on the other hand, is the acceptance of the lawful agent
of that state. The establishment of diplomatic relations is, therefore, the
creation of formal means of communication between the governments
of two states. Abstention from diplomatic intercourse may imply politi-
cal, and possibly total, nonintercourse between two states but need not
imply nonrecognition. The breach of diplomatic relations can imply
nonrecognition only when the government in one of the states has never
been recognized by the government in the other, and this is only at the
governmental, and not the state, level. The entry into diplomatic recog-
nition may imply approval of a new government while withholding rep-
resentation may imply disapproval. One international legal authority
has proposed that American nations might express collective disap-
proval of antidemocratic revolutions within the Western Hemisphere by
withholding or restricting diplomatic representation. 4 However, in the
past this approach has proven ineffective without embargoes. Further-
more, if effective, this approach would violate national sovereignty with-
out regard to established criteria as to what is a desirable government.9 5
The political effect of diplomatic nonrecognition is dubious.
The granting of recognition by a state involves the making of fac-
92. Comment, supra note 89, at 861; J. BRIERLY, supra note 90, at 140.
93. Comment, supra note 89, at 862.
94. Fenwick, The Recognition of De Facto Governments: Is There a Basis for Inter-
American Collective Action?, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1964).
The Tobar Doctrine, embodied in some Central American treaties and followed in some
instances by the United States, asserted that recognition be denied to governments obtaining power
other than by constitutimal means. It was prevalent in the period from 1907 to 1923. Conversely,
the Estrada Doctrine asserts that recognition be granted automatically to all governments.
95. One writer commented on the refusal to grant recognition to governments, under the
Stimson Doctrine, which had been imposed by external force: "The mere blowing of horns is of
little value unless the blowers are prepared to follow up their notes in some effective manner."
Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law, 47 HARV. L. REv.
776, 791 (1934). The nonrecognition of Rhodesia is another example of the doctrine's ineffective-
ness as a democratizing force.
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tual determinations tempered with considerations of policy." Although
in making a decision as to the granting or withholding of recognition a
state will seek to buttress its position by directing attention to certain
factual considerations, politics is a predominant factor. Even proposals
to establish a centralized process of recognition by taking the position
that admission to the United Nations would constitute recognition
would still not eliminate the political factor. This has been demonstrated
by the question involving the seating of Communist China. 7
The problem of recognition arises in the area of private law with
the application of the law of an unrecognized government in foreign
tribunals. Generally, where the act is brought into question, e.g., by an
adjudication as to change of status or rights and duties of persons or
ownership of property physically under the control of an unrecognized
government, the courts will enforce the foreign act. This is the case even
though the government is not officially and formally recognized for
political purposes by the foreign office of the forum state. Though a
foreign government may not be recognized by the political arm, it may
have de facto existence which is judicially cognizable." However, where
the judicial determination involves property or actions situated outside
the jurisdiction of the unrecognized foreign government, considerations
of domestic policy apply. 00 Domestic courts are thus being asked to
enforce foreign law, not merely to recognize the enforcement of it by
the foreign state. If transactions take place within a nonrecognizing
state, based on legal titles existing there at the time of the transaction,
it would seem unjust for the retroactivity of recognition to invalidate
these transactions and the titles created by them. But if at the time of
granting of political recognition the title to the property remains in the
foreign state, its corporations or its citizens, the new government can
take actions regarding it.10'
96. Alexandrowicz-Alexander, The Quasi-Judicial Function in Recognition of States and
Governments, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 631 (1952).
97. COUPIN, THE FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-60 (1965).
98. Comment, supra 89, at 872.
99. See, e.g., Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., 13 App. Div.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d
417 (1961), which involved the external affect of legal declarations of the German Democratic
Republic. A recent decision in the House of Lords may indicate a different approach. Carl-Zeiss
Stiftung v. Raynor and Keller Ltd., [196613 W.L.R. 125 [H.L.]. See Greig, The Carl Zeiss Case
and the Position of an Unrecognized Government in English Law, 83 L.Q. REV. 96 (1967).
100. Comment, supra note 89, at 878.
101. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Republic of Iraq v. First
National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965). Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. Irr'L L. 740 (1939); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964).
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Another type of situation involves the capacity of an unrecognized
government to bring suit. Generally, an unrecognized government is
denied the right to bring suit." 2 If no government is recognized politi-
cally the result is apparently a blocking of the assets of the state, leaving
them in the hands of whatever private custodians may have possession.
If a government is officially recognized by the foreign office, that gov-
ernment will be able to dispose of such assets regardless of whether it
is in actual control of the state's territory.
VI. BELLIGERENCY
Where armed civil strife occurs, the factions will have the status of
belligerents. The principle was recognized in the American Civil War,
with Lieber's Codes, that both sides must apply the laws of war. 03 This
is specifically provided by the Geneva Convention of 1949. The de jure
government must treat captured rebels as prisoners of war. Insurgency
is a question of fact distinguishable from politically motivated riots,
mob violence and revolt which has not raged beyond the control of the
de jure government by the magnitude of the hostilities and the conse-
quent uncertainty of the result. As in the Civil War, belligerency implied
that foreign states must assume the obligations of neutrality. These
obligations involve impartiality between the recognized government and
the rebels, abstention from official aid to either side, and prevention of
military expeditions from their territory to aid either side. However,
belligerency in the Civil War also implied that both the recognized
government and the rebels enjoyed the belligerent right to visit and
search merchant vessels of all states on the high seas and to capture
them if they carried contraband. The United States reluctantly accepted
the recognition of belligerency by Britain, France and other states while
making it clear that intervention would violate international law and
would be bitterly resented. The result of the American Civil War was
to identify civil war with international law and to clarify international
law regarding this area. 04
In a rebellion where the operations have reached the dimensions of
an actual war, with the rebels organized under a government which
controls a certain territory and is capable of exercising the laws of war
and with other states unable to ignore the situation, the rebels have been
102. Comment, supra note 89, at 881. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibra-
rio, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923); City of Berne v. Bank of England, 32 Eng. Rep. 636 (Ch.
1804).
103. Wright, International Law and the American Civil War, 61 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L.
50 (1967).
104. Id. at 51.
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recognized as belligerents.' The effect of the recognition of belligerency
is that the recognizing state accepts for itself all the consequences which
follow from a war, claiming the right of a neutral and according the
rights of belligerency. Both factions are accorded the rights of states for
the duration of the hostilities. In the Spanish Civil War, though Britain
and other states refused to recognize the existence of belligerency, there
was difficulty in adhering to this principle consistently, as was the case
with the Non-Intervention Agreement. 16
The United Nations Charter requires member states to refrain
from the use or threat of force except in individual or collective self-
defense against armed attack or under U.N. authority. The Charter
requires that states do nothing to assist the violator of these obligations
or to hamper the defense efforts of the victim. War, in the sense of
equality of belligerents and the equal application of the law of neutral-
ity, seems, in principle, to be outlawed. If hostilities occur, the U.N.
should actively negotiate for a cease fire. Where civil strife occurs, the
U.N. must act to contain the conflict if there is a threat to international
peace. Neither the U.N. nor individual states may be free to recognize
belligerency under these principles; in fact, no such belligerency has
been recognized since the American Civil War. 1°'
However, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, dealing with prisoners
of war, do apply to civil strife. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
applies to unconventional warfare. Prior to the Geneva Conventions,
Article 17 of the Hague Convention V (1907) had provided that troops
belonging to a government or authority not recognized by an enemy are
entitled to be treated as lawful combatants. 0 8 Guerrilla forces are af-
forded protection. A common provision of the three Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 relating to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked or armed
forces, and to prisoners of war, provides that irregular armed forces
belonging to a party of a conflict, including organized resistance move-
ments, are recognized as lawful combatants only if they comply with the
105. J. BRIERLY, supra note 90, at 141.
Traditional international law distinguished among three types of internal disorder: rebellion,
belligerency and insurgency. Rebellion was defined as a sporadic challenge to legitimate govern-
ment, while both belligerency and insurgency indicated a sustained challenge to legitimate author-
ity. Belligerency established a common set of rights and duties between external states and the
belligerents and between the belligerents themselves. Insurgency was used as a catch-all phrase,
determined by the quantity of resistance to the established authority. L. KozsCH, THE CONCEPT
OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (1956).
106. Smith, Some Problems of the Spanish Civil War, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 17 (1937).
107. Wright, supra note 103.
108. Greenspahn, International Law and Its Protection for Participants in Unconventional
Warfare, in Zawodny, supra note 73, at 30-41.
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following four conditions: (1) they must be commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (2) they must wear a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance; (3) they must carry arms openly; and,
(4) they must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of
war.
For a resistance movement to qualify for legality, it must be "or-
ganized"-a term defined by the Geneva Conventions. Implied is a
central authority of the movement to which the individual bands com-
posing it are subordinated and responsive. However, this requirement
may not be strictly construed, as resistance workers and guerrillas oper-
ate in loosely organized small bands. Many bands may spring up spon-
taneously. It is questionable whether the enemy will be able to ascertain
whether their prisoners did belong to any organized movement. The
prisoner may provide the information but is bound under Article 17 to
disclose no more than his name, rank, date of birth, serial number, or
if he has no such number, equivalent information. A prisoner providing
such information will have established that he is a member of an organ-
ized movement. But members of a resistance movement may not be
willing to provide the necessary information. The refusal to provide the
minimum information specified may only be punished disciplinarily. A
broad view of all the factors involved must be taken in weighing the
status of a prisoner to determine whether he is a member of an organ-
ized movement." 9
The irregular forces must be commanded by a person responsible
to his subordinates. The commander must exercise effective control over
those under him and must be answerable under international law for
failure to exercise appropriate measures of control within his power.
Although the commander may receive his authority from an organized
government, often he derives his position of leadership from the force
of his own personality, a position of authority previously held or from
election by his troops. The wearing of a distinctive sign by members of
a guerrilla band may be difficult to reconcile with the very nature of
such warfare, as one of the chief strengths of guerrilla warfare is the
ability to merge with the general population.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that resisters aspiring to
the status of lawful combatants wear a fixed distinctive sign which will
announce their status to the enemy. This condition could be fulfilled by
109. An Israeli military court has held that the Popular Front for the Liberation of(Palestine
does not qualify under the protection of the Hague and Geneva conventions. The Kassem Case, 4
HUMAN RIGHTS J. 536 (1971).
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wearing a complete uniform; a fixed distinctive sign sewn on otherwise
normal clothing might suffice. The resister or rebel should be distin-
guishable from the civilian population. Where an enemy uniform is
used, it should be stripped of distinctive signs. Weapons must be carried
openly; thus, a concealed pistol or hand grenade would be an infraction
of this rule. The guerrillas must be instructed in the laws and customs
of warfare and must be warned by their superiors against the use of
"treachery, denial of quarantine, maltreatment of prisoners of war,
wounded and dead, improper conduct towards flags of truce, pillage and
unnecessary violence and destruction." 110 Killing and wounding by
treachery include acts of assassination. The use of poison and poisoned
weapons is prohibited, as are all arms, projectiles or material calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering. Under no circumstances may prisoners
be killed for the sake of mere disposal.
In countering guerrilla activities, the opposing forces must strictly
abide by the rules of warfare. Reprisals may be recognized only within
narrow limits."' Prisoners of war and civilians may not be used as
hostages,"' and torture and cruelty against them are forbidden."' The
evacuation of the population as a means of countering guerrilla warfare
may be undertaken only under strict safeguards which protect the wel-
fare of the displaced inhabitants."4 Article 5 of Geneva Convention III,
1949, provides that only a competent tribunal may determine the status
of persons accused of being unlawful combatants. It is not for the cap-
turing troops to judge the captives' status. The matter must be left to a
competent higher military authority who, in turn, must refer the case
to a competent tribunal if the prisoners are charged with being unlawful
combatants. Summary execution is absolutely forbidden. Article 7
makes it illegal to coerce a guerrilla to join the enemy forces. Both the
guerrillas and the opposing forces are subject to punishment for war
crimes.
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is applicable regard-
less of whether the rebels have belligerent status. Participants in uncon-
ventional internal warfare must comply with minimum standards of
humanity. According to these regulations, noncombatants, prisoners,
110. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL FM
27-10 64d (Washington, 1956).
Ill. E.g., Geneva Convention 111, August 12, 1949, art. 13 and art. 87, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364. Geneva Convention IV, August 12, 1949, art. 34, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365.
112. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 111, art. 34.
113. Id. art. 32; Geneva Convention III, supra note 111, art. 94.
114. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 111, art. 49.
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wounded and sick, regardless of race, color, creed, sex or social stand-
ing, must be treated humanely. Their murder, mutilation, cruel treat-
ment and torture are forbidden. The taking of hostages, outrages on
personal dignity, and sentences and executions without previous judg-
ment by regularly constituted courts affording universally recognized
judicial guarantees are also forbidden. Both the government and the
rebel side are under a legal obligation to apply these provisions; they
are also urged in Article 3 to bring into force, by special agreements,
the other provisions of the four Geneva Conventions. The International
Committee of the Red Cross is authorized to intercede with the parties
to implement these provisions. Though Article 3 represents an advance
in the humanization of internal conflicts, there are numerous indications
that even these minimum standards have been ignored.
One approach to assure standards of humane treatment in internal
civil strife as encompassed in the Geneva Conventions is the establish-
ment of ad hoc or permanent International War Crimes Tribunals or
Regional International Courts of World Habeas Corpus empowered to
hear and make determinations as to the rights of individuals."' Re-
course to the tribunals would be permitted through the Writ of World
Habeas Corpus. Individual rebels or rebel groups as well as their adver-
saries could, by use of this Writ, appeal to such a tribunal for an impar-
tial determination of their rights. Such right of appeal would be permit-
ted after the exhaustion of all available domestic recourse. If the individ-
ual affected had been adjudicated by a competent domestic tribunal, but
still felt he had been denied his due process rights, such a tribunal could
make the final determination. The international tribunal would be em-
powered to conduct on-the-spot investigations and to provide counsel
and other assistance necessary for invoking the Writ of World Habeas
Corpus. Where evidence of blatant deviation from international stan-
dards of humanity is indicated, the tribunal might also function to
determine guilt as to war crimes or possible genocide. Alternatively,
reference could be made to a specially constituted Advisory Ad Hoc
War Crimes Tribunal.
Such a tribunal could also determine whether an individual was in
fact an insurgent. A bizarre instance illustrating this problem involved
the Santa Maria case."' Captain Galvano-claiming that he was an
insurgent acting on behalf of General Humberto Delgado, the chief rival
115. Kutner, International Due Process for Prisoners of War: The Need for a Special
Tribunal of World Habeas Corpus, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 721 (1967).
116. Fenwick, "'Piracy" in the Caribbean, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 426 (1961).
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of Portugal's leader, Salazar-declared himself to be taking the first
step in a revolt against the dictator by forcefully seizing a ship, the Santa
Maria. Galvano claimed the Portuguese colony of Angola was awaiting
his arrival. In the course of the seizure, a member of the crew was killed
and the captain was put under arrest. The crew was terrorized although
Galvano was kind to passengers as he looked for a port where they could
disembark. Galvano finally sought asylum in Brazil, claiming to be an
insurgent. He asserted this status only after seizing the ship. The status
of insurgency is conceded to any citizen who believes that the govern-
ment of his country is tyrannical and should be overthrown, but there
must be some status of actual insurgency. The futility of the military
effort in seizing the Santa Maria might in itself seem to condemn the
act. However, the resulting beneficial propaganda might serve to justify
the seizure, notwithstanding the fact that the vessel was unarmed and
incapable of military action. That in itself could have been the beginning
of revolution. But international law offers no valid precedent for the use
of armed force in prosecuting a nonmilitary objective. The Brazilian
authorities were affected by internal factors in making a determination.
An impartial rule of law determination could have best been made by
an international tribunal.
VII. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD HABEAS CORPUS
In addition to the Geneva Conventions, concern for the interna-
tional protection of human rights is to be found in the United Nations
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights along with the
draft covenants of the Human Rights Commission. Before World War
II, international expression for protection of human rights was found
in the rules of war. Those rules were expressed in the Hague Conven-
tions, in the right of humanitarian intervention where foreign nationals
were mistreated, in the movement to outlaw slavery and slave trading
and the protection of women, and in the conventions of the International
Labor Organization which established minimum standards for the pro-
tection of workers. The Minorities Treaties after World War I sought
to confer protection on national groups residing within the states of
eastern and central Europe which were established as a result of the
break up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The League of Nations
Mandate System provided for the protection of inhabitants of the man-
date territories. However, the major impetus for the human rights
movement came with the oppressions of the Nazis during the 1930's, the
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goals of the allies during World War II and the precedent of the Nurem-
berg Trials."7
The Preamble of the United Nations Charter asserts that it is the
task of the United Nations to reaffirm faith "in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women, and of nations large and small." Article 1, Para-
graph 3, declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to
achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights for all
without distinction as to race, sex, lInguage and religion.
When this is coupled with Article 56, requiring that "all members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55(a)," some text writers have contended that member states are obliged
to protect the fundamental human rights of their subjects."18 But these
fundamental human rights were left undefined.
Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter, which precludes the United
Nations from interfering with matters which are "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state," may not be invoked to preclude
action on these matters. This is because the members of the United
Nations have obliged themselves to the promotion and protection of
human rights. In many instances, as in South Africa, the denial of
human rights creates situations which constitute a threat to interna-
tional peace. In these cases, the nonintervention clause may not apply.
Clearly, a situation involving rebellion or internal civil strife may well
constitute a threat to peace which could involve the action of the United
Nations. In the modern world, it is virtually impossible to delineate
matters of exclusively domestic jurisdiction.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines "fundamental
rights and human freedoms," setting forth a common standard of action
for their promotion. It was unanimously adopted by the General Assem-
117. This historical development is discussed in Kutner, World Habeas Corpus, Human
Rights and World Community, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 3, 20-27 (1967).
118. H. Lauterpacht, Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights of Man, ch. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/89 (1948); M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ch. IV (1962); K. CHAKRAVARTI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 47-51 (1958). A different interpretation is given in KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 29-33 (1964).
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bly at its third session in Paris."' At that time, it was believed to have
only moral force with a Covenant to be drafted later and submitted to
the members for acceptance. But the document has subsequently in-
creased in legal weight. The General Assembly has come to treat it as
a statement of universal principles. In adopting the Declaration of the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960,
1961 and 1962, the General Assembly asserted that "all states shall
observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present
Declaration.""12 The words "shall observe" indicate a legal imperative.
The measure passed the United Nations General Assembly three times
without a negative vote. The Universal Declaration has become the
yardstick for measuring the progress of governments and peoples and
has been incorporated in regional treaties and in the constitutions of new
states. The Declaration was a factor in stimulating two regional conven-
tions: the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the Draft
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.'
The United Nations has also encouraged the protection and pro-
motion of human rights through the drafting of covenants. Various
treaties have been adopted-beginning with the Genocide Convention
which has been in force since 1951-which bind the parties to prevent
and punish within their territories the destruction of any national, reli-
gious, or ethnic group. Other United Nations conventions now in force
involve the rights of refugees, stateless persons, the political rights of
women, the nationality of married women and slavery. Also in force are
International Labor Organization conventions concerning forced labor
and discrimination in employment and a UNESCO convention on dis-
crimination in education.' Conventions on other aspects of human
rights are at various stages of completion.
Although the United Nations has conferred substantive rights upon
the individual, it has failed to provide him with the means for asserting
these rights. The outmoded concept still persists that the individual is
not a subject, but only an object, of international law and, therefore,
lacks standing to petition or seek recourse from an international tri-
bunal. The individual has had to rely upon the state of which he is a
national to act for him. However, the granting of the right of individuals
to sue another state directly for the redress of injuries caused by the
119. Kutner, supra note 117, at 25.
120. J. LASLEY, MY COUNTRY RIGHT OR WRONG? 9 (1966).
121. Id. at 10.
122. G. GARDNER, IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER 241-42 (1964).
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action of that state is not entirely without precedent. For example, the
Treaty of Versailles established Mixed Arbitral Tribunals between each
allied state and Germany to adjudicate claims for compensation made
by allied nationals for injuries to their property rights in Germany. Also,
the German-Polish Upper Silesia Convention, concluded in 1922, pro-
vided for an Arbitral Convention which heard private claims protecting
minority rights. Groups had a direct right to bring complaints. Further-
more, the International Labor Organization provides for representation
of individuals through labor or employer groups. Groups were repre-
sented at the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and the
Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.12 1
A stride toward conferring standing upon individuals was taken
with the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights which
established a Human Rights Commission and Court. An individual who
has been denied his rights may, after the exhaustion of all available
domestic remedies, make application to the Commission. The Commis-
sion will examine the matter and seek to resolve it by consultation. It
may also issue a report and then refer the matter to the Court which
may also hear matters referred to it by a contracting party against which
an application has been filed. An individual may make application to
the Commission by presenting the case in person or by inducing a
government to act on his behalf. Though an individual may not present
his case before the Court, he is permitted to communicate his views. 124
World Habeas Corpus would constitute the major breakthrough by
permitting the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other international treaties, conventions and pronounce-
ments pertaining to the rights of the individual. The proposal for World
Habeas Corpus envisages the establishment of a world tribunal and
seven regional tribunals reflecting differing cultural and legal systems.
Individuals who are unlawfully detained or restricted in their movement
would, upon the exhaustion of all domestic recourse, be able to invoke
the Writ of World Habeas Corpus to seek review by the proper regional
tribunal with final appeal to the World Court.2 5 The writ of habeas
123. These developments are discussed in W. FRIEDMANN, CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ch. 4 (1964).
124. McNair, The Expansion of International Law, Hebrew University, Lionel Cohen Lec-
tures, 1962; Mashaw, Federal Issues in and about the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 40 TULANE L. REV. 21 (1965).
125. International protection would be rooted in diverse patterns of law by dividing the world
into nine circuits: (1) Communist-Oriental; (2) U.S.S.R.-Eastern European; (3) Western European;
(4) Islamic; (5) Southern African; (6) Non-Communist Oriental; (7) Austral-Oceanic; (8) Latin
American; (9) Anglo-American. Each circuit would be composed of seven judges, of whom at least
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corpus has long been accepted as a hallowed remedy in the common law
tradition for judicial recourse by an individual who has been arbitrarily
deprived of his liberty. The writ has also been adopted in other forms
by other legal systems. For example, in Latin America, Amparo has
emerged as an analogous remedy.'
The movement for international protection of human rights, as well
as proposals such as World Habeas Corpus, emerges from the tradition
of the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolutions which
asserted the rights of the individual to security of person and to political
participation. Subsequently, social rights were also encompassed with
the emergence of the concept of the welfare state. This tradition con-
ceives of mankind in universal terms. Dictatorial and authoritarian gov-
ernments everywhere are challenged. The principle of national self-
determination, which has been encompassed within this tradition, will
no longer tolerate the continuance of colonialism in any form. A society
based upon racism is considered equally abhorrent. In essence, the inter-
national human rights movement and the efforts to establish World
Habeas Corpus tribunals are revolutionary. Domestic rebellion and rev-
olution, insofar as they threaten world peace, are to be limited because
they constitute a threat to the functioning of the international system. 27
The primary function of the human rights movement and the pro-
posal for World Habeas Corpus is prophylactic as related to rebellion
and revolution. 2 1 By encouraging established governments to manifest
respect for human dignity, to provide for social welfare, to follow the
principles of due process of law, to confer equal rights on all citizens,
and to encourage popular participation and national self-determination,
four would be nationals within the arena over which the particular circuit court had jurisdiction,
with at least one national from each of the world's predominant states sitting as a judge in the
circuit court having jurisdiction over that state. Judicial composition would reflect power realities
in each arena. The judges would be chosen from lists of prominent jurists submitted by states in
each of the circuits. The circuit system would be capped by the supreme court, composed of nine
judges-one judge from each circuit area. A simple majority of circuit court judges could render a
decision. If two circuit judges dissent, the supreme court could review, with a vote of at least six
judges necessary to reverse. In reaching a decision, a circuit court would consider the rights of the
individual as well as the demands of society. On appeal, the supreme court would consider whether
the decision of the lower court in considering all the factors involved was so unreasonable as to
merit reversal. Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: The Legal Ultimate for the Unity of Mankind, 40
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 570 (1965).
126. United Nations Seminar on Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Other Similar Remedies
(Mexico, August 1961); United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Study of the Rights of
Everyone To Be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile (1961).
127. Falk, supra note 51; Kutner, supra note 117.
128. This point is developed in Falk, supra note 51, at 174-75. The international community
is seeking to develop mechanisms for peaceful change. Mendlovitz & Falk, Toward a Warless
World: One Legal Formula To Achieve Transition, 73 YALE L.J. 399 (1964).
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revolutions will be forestalled. When a government does not adhere to
the rule of law, the individual citizens will feel insecure and will feel little
civil obligation toward their government. Dictatorial and arbitrary rule
has led to revolts which have threatened international order. For exam-
ple, the bloody conflict in Viet Nam is to a great extent attributable to
the French suppression of national self-determination and the dicta-
torial nature of the Diem regime. The tyranny of Trujillo in the Domini-
can Republic gave rise to the internal unrest which necessitated the
landing of marines. The outrages of Batista led, in turn, to the rise of
Castro. The apartheid policies of the Union of South Africa and the
white rule in Rhodesia have created international tensions in Africa.
The human rights movement and World Habeas Corpus provide an
alternative to rebellion and revolution in'curbing arbitrary government
and in establishing the rule of law.
No international right of revolt exists as such. The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly limits
individual rights in Article 29(2):
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall
be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others, and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society.
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, as adopted by the General Assembly, does not explicitly
permit or condone rebellion as a means to end colonialism and practices
of segregation and discrimination. The human rights movement adjures
anarchy in envisioning individual rights within the context of a legal
order. The European Convention on Human Rights is even more ex-
plicit in limiting individual rights because of the necessity of maintaining
public order.
Human rights and World Habeas Corpus are primarily concerned
with the effect upon individual liberties resulting from efforts to forestall
revolts, with controlling attempted revolts, and with the consequences
of a revolution.
Many states faced with the problem of political instability have
followed the practice of preventive detention-the detaining of persons
deemed dangerous to the state who may be likely to create political
unrest or engage in rebellion. 2 ' Though such action may be necessary
129. D. BAYLEY, PUBLIC LIBERTIES IN THE NEW STATES ch. 11 (1964).
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where established institutions for political change are still in an evolu-
tionary process, the practice of preventive detention is subject to abuse.
Because the action is administrative in nature, the writ of habeas corpus
or analogous remedies may not be available to the individual who is
effected. The Writ of World Habeas Corpus would provide the needed
remedy to review the nature of the detention and its justification. The
Writ of World Habeas Corpus would also be available to review the
detention of an individual who has criticized or expressed opposition to
his government through speech or by publication. In some states, the
exercise of free speech or free press may constitute an act of rebellion.
However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other inter-
national declarations already expressly grant the right to freedom of
thought and expression as well as the right of assembly. These are basic
human rights; an individual detained for exercising these rights should
have recourse to World Habeas Corpus. The international tribunal
would consider each case on its merits in determining whether the indi-
vidual's activities did in fact constitute an act of rebellion.
Some governments, in order to forestall rebellion, have restricted
the movement of their citizens or other individuals, thereby infringing
upon the freedom of movement and the right to leave and enter a
country. 130 The right to freedom of movement has also become a recog-
nized human right in international law. Where it is infringed, the Writ
of World Habeas Corpus could be invoked as a means for determining
whether the governmental action was arbitrary. Here again, a human
right may be balanced with the need for maintaining public order.',
A government, whether by suppressing a rebellion or by consolidat-
ing its position following a successful coup, might act to restrict freedom
of assembly, association, press, or religious freedom and thus infringe
upon recognized internationally protected human rights.' 3 Individuals
detained for exercising these rights should have recourse to an interna-
tional tribunal by the summary remedy of World Habeas Corpus.
Where an individual is detained for actually engaging in an act of
rebellion, such as an attempted coup or putsch or other insurgent action,
he is entitled to a fair trial. But under such circumstances, there is a
130. Ingles, Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave Any
Country Including His Own and To Return to His Country, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SU o/2/220 REV.
I/CORR (1948).
131. See Kutner, Due Process of Family Privacy: World Civil Liberty and World Habeas
Corpus, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 626-27 (1967).
132. See generally 8 J. INT'L COMM. OF JURISTS (special issue, Part I for Human Rights
Year) (Dec. 1968).
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tendency to be less sensitive to civil liberties. Traditional judicial safe-
guards may be revoked, as during the American Civil War when protec-
tion of the writ of habeas corpus was limited because of the exigencies
of military rule.' In precisely such a situation, the Writ of World
Habeas Corpus would also determine whether the punishment, when
considered in light of the acts committed, was inhumane. The possibility
of exile as an alternative to imprisonment or execution might be consid-
ered.
133. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869). Earlier, in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866),
the Court upheld the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of an individual
detained by military authorities in the course of the Civil War. The writ was defied and subse-
quently Congress changed the law which had deprived thr Supreme Court of jurisdiction. This was
reflected in the decision in Ex Parte McCardle, supra.
During World War I!, the Supreme Court refused to issue writs of habeas corpus and, in
effect, upheld the mass detention of Japanese on the West Coast. Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
In Northern Ireland, likewise, suspected terrorists have been detained pursuant to the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (N. I. 7, 1922) and the Public Orders Act (N.I., 1951) and
regulations issued in conjunction therewith. The Home Secretary is, in effect, authorized to detain
any person he suspects of terrorist activity. A Northern Ireland court has held the writ of habeas
corpus may not issue. See H. CALVERT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND, A STUDY
IN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 380-87 (1960); Edwards, Special Powers in Northern Ireland, 1956
CRIM. L. REV. 7. Pursuant to this authority over 300 persons were detained in Northern Ireland
following the perpetration of terrorist acts. The Times (London), Aug. 10, 1971, at I, col. 1. For
comments on the legal aspect, see Berlins, Stormont's Last Resort Against Terrorism, The Times
(London), Aug. 9, 1971, at 12, col. 4.
In Latin America, political instability has resulted in the suspension of Amparo and other
guarantees. For example, in Brazil, the military (which, in truth, runs the government) has detained
and tortured opponents of the regime, including journalists. Heren, Use and Abuse of Power in
Brazil, The Times (London), Oct. 8, 1971, at 12, col. I. Generally, Latin American constitutions
contain protections from arbitrary detention. Canago, Claim ofAmparo in Mexico: Constitutional
Protection of Human Rights, 6 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 201 (1970). Zamudio, Latin American
Procedures for the Protection of the Individual, 9 J. INT'L COMM. OF JURISTS 60 (1968). However,
as one commentator observed:
All of the Latin American countries have elaborate bills of rights. It is apparent that
the courts of these states are faced with heavy responsibilities in interpreting and applying
the law as it relates to civil rights, especially if the constitutional elements of such rights
remain couched in 19th century terms. For the most effective functioning of the courts in
these matters, there are three conditions which are probably fundamental: the judges
must have a concern of their own broad responsibility, the affected public must be con-
scious of the role of the judiciary, the court must establish a rapport with other branches
of government, and mutual tolerance and respect must exist among the several branches.
It surely must be apparent that these conditions do not exist in certain Latin American
states, and to the extent that they are absent democracy is thereby hurt or retarded.
Fitzgibbon, The Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Political Scientist's Point of View,
44 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 118 (1950). In Latin America, one almost never encounters a judicial veto
or even restraint of a presidential decree or legislative enactment even though the courts have broad
power of constitutional review. This is reflected in the Latin American tradition of the Cadillo,
that law emanates from the ruler. The tradition of an independent judiciary is lacking. A.N.
Christensen, Strong Governments and Weak Courts, in THE EVOLUTION OF LATIN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, A BOOK OF READINGS 469-77 (A.N. Christensen ed. 1951).
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Although international law may not sanction rebellion as such, an
international tribunal in considering a case of rebellion in determining
the disposition of a Writ of World Habeas Corpus could consider the
circumstances of the particular revolt. An act of rebellion against a
democratically constituted government could be considered differently
from a rebellious act against a dictatorial regime which has manifested
little regard for individual rights or has pursued a conscious policy of
racial segregation.
Though adherence to law is a basic international norm, instances
arise where civil disobedience is justified, such as those in which the laws
disobeyed are in themselves in violation of international law. The Nu-
remberg principles may make such disobedience imperative. Similarly,
situations may arise in which a particular government stands in total
contempt of international standards, thereby justifying revolt. An inter-
national tribunal could also consider whether violence was used in fur-
thering the rebellious action. International law condemns the wanton
use of violence in international relations. Similar condemnations could
apply to internal strife if it appears that the conflict may well expand
to the international arena. On the other hand, rebellion carried on by
the use of such nonviolent techniques as civil disobedience, noncoopera-
tion and boycotts or general strikes may constitute less of a threat to
international peace. 134
Another aspect of rebellion is the right to political asylum. Subse-
quent to a successful coup or revolution, some individual may be com-
pelled to flee because of fear of reprisal. Individuals who engage in
rebellious activity may also leave their country seeking asylum else-
where. International law, through the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and through treaties and declarations pertaining to the rights of
refugees, has established the right to asylum as an international human
134. Case histories involving the application of such techniques are presented in M. SIBLEY,
THE QUIET BATTLE (1963). For a concise analysis, see generally C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
CONSCIENCE, TACTICS & THE LAW (1971); A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE (1971); H. BEDEAO, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, THEORY AND PRACTICE (1971); H. ZINN,
DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: NINE FALLACIES ON LAW AND ORDER (1971).
Classical democratic theory recognised but one alternative to the state of normal
politics-revolution. The only forms of protest it sanctioned in times when things were
not so bad as to warrant the overthrow of the government were speaking out against the
government and voting for the opposition. In our day, however, some citizens of demo-
cratic states have begun to practice a third type of protest which if not a form of normal
politics is also a type of revolutionary activity-civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is a
form of political protest in which the protesters break a law in order to draw attention to
their cause. Although civil-disobedients intentionally violate the law, they are not common
criminals. They do not try to evade punishment.
Marantz, Book Review, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 13, 1971, at 6.
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right. 135 An individual may enjoy the hospitality of asylum if he refrains
from engaging in political activities. Where an individual's right to
asylum is denied, such as by expulsion or deportation, he should have
the right to invoke the proposed Writ of World Habeas Corpus. When,
as in the case of Moise Tshombe, an individual who enjoys political
asylum is kidnapped, he (or those acting on his behalf) should be permit-
ted to invoke the Writ of World Habeas Corpus to seek his release from
detention. '3
Related to the right of asylum is the basic human right to national-
ity. As demonstrated by the 1967 coup in Greece, the regime in power
may seek to avenge itself against opponents who are situated outside its
jurisdiction by depriving them of their nationality or citizenship. Such
an action is clearly arbitrary. Since the denial of nationality may deprive
an individual of his ability to travel or to acquire a passport, he may be
135. Weis, Territorial Asylum, 6 INDIANA J. INT'L L. 173 (1966); Khan, Asylum-Article
14 of The Universal Declaration, 8 J. INT'L COMM. OF JURISTS 27 (1967); Weis, The United
Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L LAW 92 (1969).
The right of asylum is reflected in the international law and practice regarding extradition.
Generally, a person accused of committing what is regarded as a political offense is not subject to
extradition. The problem lies in defining what kind of crimes may be regarded as political. Garcia-
Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. PITT.
L. REV. 371 (1953); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradi-
tion Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962); Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle
of Nonextradition of Political Offenses, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927 (1964).
The concept of political offenses as a limitation on extradition began with the treaty between
Belgium and France in 1834. l.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (1971).
American courts have put a premium on acts of violence and terror in determining what constitutes
a political offense. In the case of In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Calif. 1894) a federal court defined
a political offense as any offense committed in the course of furthering civil war, insurrection or
political commotion. This principle was followed in Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1957) in denying a Yugoslav demand for extradition of a Croatian alleged to have collaborated
with the Nazi occupation. The principle was also followed in Rami v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.
Fla. 1959). But in Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 48
(1963), a Venezuelan request for extradition was granted where the accused, who had been Presi-
dent of Venezuela, was indicted for allegedly embezzling public funds; no violent activity was
charged by the Venezuelan government. See SHEARER, supra at 180-81.
An example of British government practice with regard to asylum was shown in a reply to a
question in Parliament by the Foreign Secretary regarding intervention to protect the interests of
an English subject. The subject was the wife of the Burmese Foreign Minister who had been placed
in solitary confinement by the Burmese government following the overthrow of the U Nu govern-
ment. The former foreign minister had been denied trial and counsel. The British Foreign Secretary
replied that efforts would be taken to protect the wife's interests and, although Britain could not
intervene officially, the Burmese Ambassador had been told to inform his government that the
husband would be granted asylum in Britain if released. E. LAUTERPACHT, BRITISH PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (1967).
136. This principle was dramatized by the Petition for a Writ of World Habeas Corpus for
Moise Tshombe which was presented to the United Nations via the Human Rights Commission,
July 27, 1967.
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regarded as being detained. Such an individual should be permitted to
invoke the Writ of World Habeas Corpus so that an international tri-
bunal may determine his status. 37
The use of World Habeas Corpus and the enforcing of human
rights within the context of rebellion do constitute an intervention into
an internal political controversy. However, because of the nature of
international society, with its myriad of extranational and supranational
institutions, internal strife-rebellion and revolution-cannot be insu-
lated from international ramifications. Where international interests
encompassing the protection of human rights are involved, a limited
type of international intervention becomes imperative.
Rebellion and revolution result from a tradition which has its philo-
sophical roots in antiquity. The justification for revolt against arbitrary
rule and the usurpation of authority has been recognized since time
immemorial. In the 19th and 20th centuries, this justification has
been encompassed in the revolutionary tradition which stems from
the American and French Revolutions. This tradition has become a
part of the human rights movement. 3 ' Though international declara-
tions solemnly assert the right of national self-determination, world
powers have intervened in the internal strife of other nations to affect
the course of revolt in order to promote national self-interest. Such
intervention may thwart popular sovereignty. However, occasions may
arise in which such intervention is justified to further the needs of
international order since revolution, by its very nature, may threaten
established institutions. International norms involving intervention
may best be implemented by adjudication of an ad hoc or permanent
War Crimes Tribunal which would militate against unilateral inter-
vention.
Revolution involves the international community by raising the
problem of recognizing new governments and the external application
of their laws. Where civil war arises and a state of belligerency is recog-
nized, the rules of war apply.
Rebellion and its consequences involve problems of human rights.
In dealing with guerrilla operations and in coping with insurrection, the
governing authorities as well as the insurgents are obliged, under the
Geneva Conventions, to adhere to standards of humanity. Insurgency
137. Kutner, supra note 131, at 628. Rebellion or revolution may affect family privacy
resulting in the separation of family members, a matter which should also be considered by an
international tribunal through the Writ of World Habeas Corpus. The right of individual privacy
may also be involved.
138. "That is the revolution that is coming .... It could be a revolution in the nature of
an explosive political regeneration." W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 96-97 (1970).
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results in crisis situations in which respect for individual rights may be
suspended, thus giving rise to arbitrary action. International norms of
human rights may thereby be negated. World Habeas Corpus, by per-
mitting access to regional international judicial tribunals, provides a
means for the individual who is detained arbitrarily to assert his rights.
VIII. THE CHALLENGE OF REVOLUTION
Revolution has become endemic, characterizing contemporary in-
ternational and domestic politics and challenging international law. The
concept of revolution arose in ancient Egypt with the earliest recorded
description of change through violence occurring in 1962 B.C. Though
ancient Egyptian inscriptions denounced revolution as an impious defi-
ance of divine will, it has come today to be accepted and even idealized
as a way of life." 9
A. The Concept of Revolution
Four main strands may be detected in the present concept of revo-
lution: (1) Marx and de Tocqueville regarding the economic aspect as
controlling, with Marx regarding revolution as an outgrowth of human
misery and de Tocqueville viewing it as resulting from prosperity, or
"the revolution of rising expectations"; (2) Crane Brinton and Chalmers
A. Johnson regarding social pressures as the cause of revolution, re-
sulting from the failure of society to meet the demands put upon it; (3)
such scholars as Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton regarding individ-
ual alienation as the cause of revolution; and, (4) such classical political
thinkers as Aristotle, Machiavelli and Locke regarding revolution as a
political phenomenon.
A conceptually precise definition of the concept of revolution satis-
factory to all scholars is not possible. Although obviously change and
conflict are involved, there is disagreement about the nature of the
change and conflict. The term "revolution" was originally used to de-
scribe the rotation of celestial bodies following natural, inexorable laws,
and during the Renaissance it referred to the interference of superhu-
man, uncontrollable forces in world events. 40 In the 17th century the
term took on political implications, referring to a return to some pre-
established point-impliedly to some preordained order.'41 Accordingly,
the Restoration of the English monarchy in 1660 was a revolution while
139. P. CALVERT, REVOLUTION 112-13 (1970).
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the upheavals of the 1640's constituted a rebellion . 2 In the 18th cen-
tury, the term gained new meaning with the appearance of the "revolu-
tionary" romantic hero, the individual whose actions can alter the
course of history.' To Hannah Arendt, the concept of revolution in-
volves the connection of novelt, and freedom.'
To other scholars, however, revolution is "the acceptance of viol-
ence to bring about change."' 45 Scholars at the Princeton University
Center of International Studies, who have undertaken research on revo-
lution, have applied the term "internal war" to "attempts to change by
violence, or threats of violence, a government's policies, rulers, or or-
ganization."' 46 With this terminology, there is less need to distinguish
between revolution and counterrevolution, and considerable emphasis is
given to the role of violence.
Other writers regard revolution as implying broader changes. To
them revolution entails a fundamental change in the social order, the
nature of the state, and the functions of the government. 4
To Hannah Arendt, the modern concept of revolution is identified
with the French and American Revolutions.'48 She believes that while
the American Revolution involved liberation and the granting of equal-
ity before the law, the French Revolution encompassed what she terms
"the social question"-the elimination of human misery and poverty.
It is the latter, which found continued expression with the Russian
Revolution, which has been most influential in shaping the revolution-
ary tradition. She attributes this development to the fact that the Ameri-
can Revolution was not directly relevant to the European situation;
though poverty existed, the New World was not confronted with the
142. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 35-36 (1963).
143. Neumann, The International Civil War, in 1 WORLD POLITICS 335 (1949).
144. H. ARENDT, supra note 142.
145. C. JOHNSON, REVOLUTION AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 10 (1964).
146. INTERNAL WAR I (H. Eckstein ed. 1964). Chalmers Johnson uses four criteria for
distinguishing the types of revolution: (1) the targets of the revolution, whether the regime, the form
of government, or the community; (2) the identity of the revolutionaries, whether the elite, the
masses, or the elite-led masses; (3) the goals or ideology; and, (4) the timing, whether spontaneous
or calculated. On the basis of these criteria, he identifies six types of revolution: (1) the Jacquerie
(the mass peasant uprising); (2) the Millenarian Rebellion (the mass peasant uprising plus charis-
matic leadership); (3) the Anarchistic Rebellion (the attempt to restore an already shattered so-
ciety, as in the Vendee Rebellion, 1793-1796); (4) the Jacobin-Communist Revolution (spontaneous
social revolution, as in France or Russia); (5) the Conspiratorial Coup d'Etat; and, (6) the Militar-
ized Mass Insurrection (the calculated nationalist and social revolution utilizing guerrilla warfare,
as in China from 1937 to 1949, in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, and in North Vietnam from 1945 to
1954). C. JOHNSON, supra note 145, at 27-28.
147. Yoder, Current Definitions of Revolution, 32 AM. J. SOCIOL. 441 (1926).
148. H. ARENDT, supra note 142, at 26, 36, 43.
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degree of want and misery which prevailed in the Old. While the Ameri-
can Revolution focused on the ideal of freedom, the French revolution-
ary tradition stressed liberation and the establishment of a new society.
Arendt, however, criticizes the French Revolution for its failure to focus
on the American revolutionary tradition.
B. The Pattern of Revolution
The historian Crane Brinton contends that he has found a pattern
to revolutions as a result of his study of three specific revolutions: the
Cromwellian Revolution in England, the American Revolution and the
Russian Revolution.' He characterizes the French and Russian
Revolutions as social revolutions; the American, he contends, was
basically nationalistic. 50 In Brinton's case studies, prior to each revolu-
tion the society was characterized by the rising expectations of an
emerging class challenging the privileged ruling class. In Brinton's
model, which is based upon his case studies, the government is con-
fronted with financial plight and administrative inefficiency. The intel-
lectuals have become alienated, tending to reject the established order
and conceive a new and better society. Resistance to authority, which
is both spontaneous and planned to some degree, occurs. With the
occurrence of a certain event, the old regime is overthrown and a "hon-
eymoon" period follows wherein all factions coalesce. However, this
coalition is soon challenged by extremist groups and a crisis of "dual
sovereignty" occurs. The extremists assume power and a reign of terror
ensues-the fever point of the revolution-followed by a reaction, or
"Thermidor." Brinton believes most nations must at some time undergo
a period of turmoil or revolution. 5 ' He finds that the revolutions he has
studied resulted in the settling of the worst abuses and inefficiencies of
the old regime though the average person encountered little change in
his daily life. A revolutionary tradition is established with the "sting out
of the radical ideas and slogans of earlier days.""'5 These ideals remain
as a part of the rhetoric of tradition, e.g., "Liberty, Equality and Fra-
ternity."
C. Preconditions
Chalmers Johnson, who identifies revolutions with violent change,
contends that they occur in response to a desire to redirect the system
149. See generally C. BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1957).
150. See Brinton's statement in Hearings on the Nature of Revolution Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1968).
151. Id. at 36.
152. C. BRINTON, supra note 149, at 250-52.
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in the absence of normal evolution. Revolution occurs because of a
disequilibrium in the system, or a "dysfunction." For a revolution to
result, the level of dysfunction must exceed the capacity of traditional
or accepted means of society to deal with the situation. The revolution
will occur unless the elite abdicates nonviolently.5 3 The dysfunctions,
even when confronting a stubborn ruling elite, will not of themselves
produce a revolution unless there are factors-the "accelerators of dys-
functions" or triggers-which catalyze the already existent revolution-
ary level of dysfunctions. Though not of themselves the bases of the
revolution, they will provide the sufficient immediate cause of the fol-
lowing revolution.'54
Harry Eckstein distinguishes between "preconditions" and "pre-
cipitants." The latter refers to an event which actually initiates violence,
while the former refers to the circumstances making revolution possible.
For an "internal war" or revolution to occur, precipitant events must
set it off; these events will not set it off unless the preconditions of the
revolution are already present in the society.'55
Preconditions may include the element of foreign control, e.g., by
an alien dynasty. In modern times the motivating force against foreign
control has been nationalism. 5 Today most subject peoples of imperial
states have gained their political freedom. Foreign economic control,
however, is more pervasive because of the concentration of economic
resources in the United States, the Soviet Union and Western Europe,
which causes the revolt of the developing "have not" countries. Unrest
will be produced under certain given conditions as, for example, in
Hungary in 1956 when a revolutionary environment existed. The precip-
itant or trigger in that instance was the unrest then occurring in Po-
land. 57 A source of frustration in colonial areas may also be the crum-
bling of communal solidarity and ways of life among tribally organized
peoples. This weakening of solidarity often results from the imposition
of Western norms and produces disorientation. 5 1
Economic conditions may be another factor causing revolution.
Although a deteriorating economic situation may produce unrest, it will
not necessarily produce revolution.'59 On the other hand, an advancing
153. C. JOHNSON, supra note 145, at 8.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Eckstein, On the Etiology of Internal Wars, 4 HISTORY AND THEORY 140 (1965).
156. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 39.
157. Id. at 40.
158. E. HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS
42 (1958).
159. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 42-44.
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economic growth rate did not forestall revolutions in France or Russia.
Revolution may be produced by economically successful people who
believe that further advance is blocked by existing conditions. 6" In
preindustrial societies, rapid economic change of itself may cause social
dislocation and possibly revolution.
Political agitation and the appeal of political slogans may produce
unrest.' 6 ' Individual unrest must, however, be transformed into inte-
grated mass unrest before meaningful political activity can occur. In
almost any modern society there is some separation of economic power
from political and social power. It is only when these forms of power
become highly disparate and combine with other sources of discontent
that a revolutionary situation is created. Political concessions, e.g., the
broadening of suffrage or the easing of entry of new groups into political
office, are easier to grant than social or economic reforms.
Thomas Molnar, a critic of what he regards as modern revolution-
ary thought with its source in the Enlightenment, contends that the
Enlightenment philosophers and their successors sought to construct a
new state and an ideal society with a "totalitarian temptation."' 62 At-
tacking the established order, including the church, the revolutionaries
shaped the mental-moral climate which caused the French government
to doubt its own legitimacy. Thus, the French government became in-
creasingly timid and hesitant before the philosophers' onslaught; Louis
XVI began to doubt his own authority. A similar progression of events,
according to Molnar, occurred in Russia.
To Molnar, the French Revolution had two roots: Rousseau's to-
talitarian democracy and Hegel's idealism, both of which presupposed
a "state of corruption to be transcended by one of purity."'' 3 Through
revolutionary thought, a means is postulated to secure the passage from
the old system to the new.
The promise of the revolutionary doctrine is, then, predicated
on the denial of stable forms, whether of art, institutions, or
the meaning of words, and on the denial of time, of the neces-
sary and beneficient interval between conceiving and executing
projects. The doctrine promises everything for "tomorrow,"
whether the classless society, the end of all wars, riches for all
men, or a more human mankind. Hence, the destruction of the
160. Id.
161. Id. at 44.
162. T. MOLNAR, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION ch. 1 (1969).
163. Id. at 54.
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old becomes an urgent matter, an historic duty. Shirking this
duty, let alone obstructing the avenue of progress, is a major
crime, in fact the only sin the revolutionary recognizes. 4
The revolutionary ideas are transmitted to the leaders of society,
the reading public. The most naturally attracted are the wealthy classes.
Respectability of the revolution in our time, Molnar contends, is
achieved by the gradual penetration of modern radical ideas into the
middle class.6 5 These ideas are propagandized through the mass media.
An important prerevolutionary condition is the weakening of the
existing regime; it becomes increasingly unable to resolve the problems
facing it.6' For example, the prerevolutionary French regime faced con-
tinuing financial crises and was unable to summon sufficient resources
to cope with them. Similarly, in Russia, the Romanov regime was drift-
ing in the early days of the 20th century, devoid of imagination and
assuming a weary air of defeatism. Even now, developing nationalistic
states manifest weak governments which spawn a spate of coups, e.g.,
the governments of U Nu in Burma, Sukarno in Indonesia and Kasa-
vubu in the Congo.
Connected with government weakness is the disintegration of the
ruling elite.' 7 The ruling class often proves to be divided and inept,
losing its cohesion and ability. Important segments of the intellectual
community become alienated and shift their allegiance.
D. Revolutionary Action
To some degree, violence is the midwife to every revolutionary
birth. 68 Incumbents may surrender to a mere threat of force if the
regime is weak or if the insurgents are well prepared; if the threat is not
effective, violence breaks out. Revolutionary activity may be initiated
by gradually intensifying disputes between large and competing groups
within the existing power structure. These disputes are frequently
clothed in legal or constitutional terms. If the disputants cannot agree
upon suitable compromises or palliatives, violence leading to a sudden
overthrow or to civil war may ensue. This characterized the English
Revolution of the 16th century and the French and American Revolu-
tions. Another type of revolutionary birth is the coup d'etat, exemplified
by Peron's rise to power in Argentina.
164. Id. at 55-56.
165. Id. ch. 3.
166. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 46.
167. Id. at 49.
168. Id. at 56.
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Many instances have occurred in which revolutionary acts have
failed to force policy changes or to overthrow governments. A signifi-
cant failure of a coup was the attempt by German army officers to
assassinate Hitler and overthrow his Nazi regime in July 1944. Mass
peasant uprisings seem particularly doomed to failure."6 9
Those who mount a revolution must destroy the old system and
hamstring its elite. But they must also reconstruct and build. Accord-
ingly, revolution entails the twin elements of destruction and reconstruc-
tion. This was particularly true of the Chinese revolution. The Manchus
fell to the temporizing regime of Yuan Shi Kai, which in turn was
overrun by Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese Communists. In all these
stages something had to be destroyed, compromised or nullified. The
monarchy was abolished, the class structure altered by the execution of
the landlords, family life and social mores attacked, and the mechanism
of military service used to uproot the individual from his traditional
context. These phases were cumulative, with little remaining of the
Chinese system of 1900. Several generations of destruction had to be
balanced by ideological consolidation and political rehabilitation, which
has constituted the task of Mao since 1949. Reconstruction has taken
the form of the amelioration of material conditions, a regeneration of
ideological justifications (the Red Guard purge) and a frenzied effort to
rebuild. 170
The destruction-reconstruction dyad is well symbolized by the inev-
itable treason trials which are held during or following virtually every
revolution and the equally common attempts to draft new constitutions.
With the former there is rejection of the past and a new beginning is
made. Changes appear to be grandiose, but are really symbolic. The
revolutionary government seeks to demonstrate dramatic progress by
symbolic acts which are of limited substance.'7' The mass is transubstan-
tiated into "the people" with the establishment of "people's republics"
and "people's democracies." The opposite, however, is the case when
revolutionary action is used as a pretext to wield centralized authority. 72
Other symbolic acts include the abolition of titles and a variety of other
names and labels. Frantic efforts may be undertaken to eliminate rats
or flies as a symbol of revolutionary progress. Revolutionary Egypt
symbolized revolutionary progress by building the Aswan Dam and
nationalizing the Suez Canal.
169. Id. at 61.
170. Id. at 63-66.
171. Id. at 68.
172. Id. at 65.
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The revolution gradually exhausts itself. There may be recupera-
tion. Possibly there is the interruption of counter-revolution. Although
order ultimately returns, chaos and uncertainty remain for many years.
A tendency exists to embrace varied programs and adventures as revolu-
tionary goals. Some revolutionaries regard the success of their revolu-
tion as presaging a world revolution. The struggle between Trotsky and
Stalin was over the question of "permanent revolution" versus "revolu-
tion in one country."' Hitler sought to infect Europe with his revolu-
tion. Castro seeks to export his revolution to the rest of Latin America.
Most revolutions produce dictatorships of some sort.174 Successful revo-
lutions also encourage future attempts at revolution.
No revolution is immune to the world environment. Revolution in
a given area may be fostered by other governments and inspired by
examples elsewhere. The tactics of Mao Tse Tung, in conducting guer-
rilla activity and rallying peasant support prior to extending the revolu-
tion to the cities, inspired similar tactics by Che Guevara and Regis
Debray in Latin America.'"
E. Leadership
Though revolutions do not arise from conspiracy alone, certain
types of individuals must appear to articulate the problem, focus the
discontent, suggest alternatives and rationalize the need for change. The
agitators need to have the education to create ideology or to transform
the specific complaints into generalized criticism. Other more daring
types of leaders must plan for violence, lead the actual attack on the
regime and carry the rebellion through to victory. Still other types must
consolidate the new order and carry out some of the promises made in
the earlier stages. The personnel turns over as the revolt progresses
although occasionally a rare person appears who combines all these
ideal qualities of leadership. 7 ' The leaders, if not fanatics, should be
men of firm determination, considerable self-esteem and confidence in
the rightness of their cause. The consolidators must be men of stability,
political acumen and flexibility. In general, revolutionary leaders are
usually men of political maturity, but not yet old enough to be assimi-
lated into a ruling elite. Usually, the middle class is their origin as the
upper classes are normally satisfied with the society and the lower
classes lack the skills necessary to create a revolutionary movement.
The rank and file and the leaders are generally politically frustrated.
173. Id. at 68.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 69.
176. Id. at 94-95.
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The followers, like the leaders, do not come from the peasant class;
rather, the middle class forms the backbone of most revolutions. Stu-
dents are often prominent among revolutionary elements, especially in
the developing countries. The military is conspicuous in coups though
middle class civilians may play an important role in that form of revolu-
tion.
F. Ideology
Revolutions require guidance and justification.'77 These take the
form of ideology, "the conversion of ideas into social levers."'78 All
revolutionaries must justify what they have done by describing their
motives in selfless terms. The French and Russian Revolutions have
been the major sources of ideology. The great ideological document of
the French Revolution was the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In
Russia, there is no lack of pre- and postrevolutionary guidance and
justification. Marxian ideology has proved to be a rich vein of revolu-
tionary doctrine. Many other ideologies have produced revolution;
however, most revolutions are undertaken in the name of the people,
with their objectives couched in terms appropriate to peasants and
urban workers.
Many revolutions produce a nationalist ideology. "9 Much of na-
tionalism in underdeveloped areas is nothing more psychologically than
shared, semi-articulated discontent based on real or fancied grievances
conveniently directed against outsiders who have exploited "the na-
tives." Nationalism requires a target: a colonial power, a dominant
foreign economic interest, an old regime that can be considered as a
thing apart. Nationalism is easier to formulate where there is a shared
community of language or culture, but can arise with little community
to aid it, as in black Africa. However, some nationalistic ideologies,
such as Arab nationalism, are sui generis.
Finally, on many occasions, the revolution will develop a makeshift
ideology-arguments which make sense at the moment and satisfy the
populace but result in little, if any, cohesive scheme for postrevo-
lutionary organization.
G. Tactics
Terrorism and guerrilla activity as means of revolt have long been
romanticized. Although the term "guerrilla" is derived from the Span-
ish struggle for independence in 1808, the tactics have been applied since
177. id. at 99.
178. Id. at 100.
179. Id. at 105.
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antiquity.8 0 Terrorist groups which engaged in armed insurrection
against the Tsarist regime by attacking individual Tsarist officials in the
19th century justified their actions as a means for stirring up revolution-
ary consciousness. Che Guevara and Castro adopted precisely the same
tactics.' 8' The recently published Anarchist Cook Book contains recipes
for making bombs on the kitchen table;8 2 the original recipe was formu-
lated in detail by Johan Must over 70 years ago. The same recipes are
applicable today. The only additions to Must's work are chapters on the
use of electronic equipment and on drugs.
Though Marx, in 1848, seemed to condone terrorism, he and En-
gels later came to regard such activity as senseless, believing street and
guerrilla fighting as only of short duration.' s A new tactic in revolu-
tionary activity was adopted by Mao Tse Tung. In the 1920's, after the
Kuomintang destroyed the Communist party apparatus in the cities,
Mao was forced to undertake his famous Long March to Yenan. During
that time, he formulated new revolutionary tactics; whereas Marx and
later Lenin had focused on the proletariat situated in the cities, Mao
turned to the peasants.8 4
Mao proceeded to engage in guerrilla activity while at the same
time rallying the peasants. He combined guerrilla war with the ideology
of Marxism. In 1927, Mao set forth the prerequisites for an armed and
independent regime: (1) a sound moral base, (2) a first-rate party organ-
ization, (3) a Red Army of adequate strength, (4) a terrain favorable to
military operations and (5) economic strength sufficient for self-
reliance.' s He urged the re-education rather than the killing of prison-
ers. In a lecture to Algerian leaders in 1960, Mao stated:
[Prisoners] should not be killed. It is a mistake to believe that
by physically eliminating agitators or enemy personnel you can
serve a revolutionary cause.16
Mao justified his struggle:
180. P. CALVERT, supra note 139, at 104. Significantly, BBC news commentators have
referred to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland as "terrorists" while referring to the
Al Fatah and to similar groups in Africa as "guerrillas." Hortsius, The Words in Our Lives:
Mission in Ireland, MAARIV, Oct. 29, 1971, at 36 (in Hebrew).
181. Locquer, The Cookbook of Little Wars, MAARIV, Sept. 19, 1971, at H (in Hebrew,
Rosh Hashonah supp.).
182. J. MUST, THE ANARCHIST COOKBOOK (2d ed. 1971).
183. Locquer, supra note 181.
184. Id.
185. A. FREMANTLE, MAO TSE TUNG: AN ANTHOLOGY OF His WRITINGS xxxiii (1962).
186. Id. at xviii.
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War, the monster of mutual slaughter among mankind, will be
finally eliminated through the progress of human society, and
in no distant future. But there is only one way of eliminating
it, mainly to oppose war by means of war, to oppose counter-
revolutionary war by means of revolutionary war, to oppose
national counter-revolutionary war by means of revolutionary
war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war by revolu-
tionary class war. There are only two kinds of war in history,
just and unjust war. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust,
all revolutionary wars are just. 187
Lifton notes that Mao, particularly after assuming power, sought
transcendence, risking all, even death, to achieve his revolutionary so-
ciety.188 A sense of immortality is noted in Mao's speeches:
All men may die, but death can vary in its significance. The
ancient Chinese writer Suzuia Chu said, 'Though death befall
all men alike, it may be heavier than Mant Tai or lighter than
a feather.' To die for the people is heavier than Mant Tai, but
to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters and oppres-
sors is lighter than a feather. 89
Mao inspired his people, stressing the power of the mind as all powerful:
What is the greatest force? The greatest force is that of the
mind of the popular masses. What should we fear? We should
not fear heaven. We should not fear ghosts. We should not fear
the dead. We should not fear the bureaucrat. We should not
fear the militarist. We should not fear the capitalist.'
Mao's greatest accomplishment has been to change Marxism from
a European to an Asiatic form. He enabled Marxism-Leninism to give
expression to Chinese history.'' Maoism has, accordingly, exercised
appeal as revolutionary ideology in the developing countries. This ideol-
ogy has been combined with nationalism.
In the nationalist struggles, particularly against colonial powers,
terrorism and guerrilla warfare have been effectively applied. The expe-
rience in one struggle serves as a precedent in another. Guerrilla strug-
gles and terrorism indicate a definite pattern. The first of these strug-
187. Id. at 77.
188. R. LIFTON, REVOLUTIONARY IMMORTALITY (1968).
189. Id. at 67.
190. Id. at 69.
191. J. SPANIER, WORLD POLITICS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION 357 (1967).
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gles, the first "war of liberation," occurred with the Irish struggle and
has flared up anew in Ulster. Terrorist methods have been applied in
Palestine, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cyprus, Algeria and Indochina. The
pattern is enacted when a plan of sabotage and systematic assassination
and terror is undertaken. Members of the native population who do not
cooperate are subject to punishment by the terrorists. Western demo-
cratic governments are particularly vulnerable when they pursue a pol-
icy of suppression against terrorists in colonial areas because the meth-
ods of suppression (especially when dramatically presented on nightly
television) evoke opposition and disgust, producing domestic unrest.
Ultimately, the colonial authority is forced to give way.'92
On the other hand, when enlightened administration has been un-
dertaken to meet the demands and needs of the populace, as in Malaysia
and the Phillipines, governments have succeeded in isolating the terror-
ist movement. 93 Terrorist activity which induces a regime to take sup-
pressive measures thereby threatens the functioning of the rule of law
and due process. As has occurred in Northern Ireland, usual trial proce-
dures may not be able to function and it becomes necessary to order the
detention of terrorists. Where terrorists are brought to trial, security
may require that the accused not be confronted with certain incriminat-
ing evidence. However, even in such situations, the rudiments of due
process must be applied to assure ordered liberty. The Writ of World
Habeas Corpus might well play a role in this context.
In Cuba, Fidel Castro and his small band of guerrillas waged a
campaign against the Batista regime. Following the perpetration of
certain actions, Batista reacted by arbitrarily and cruelly infringing on
human rights and ignoring principles of due process. Batista thus alien-
ated the middle classes and paved the way for Castro's takeover. 4
The Cuban Revolution was followed by the propagation of a new
theory of guerrilla warfare for Latin America by Guevara and Regis
Debray. Guevara, in attempting to formulate an ideology for the Revo-
lution, stated that the guerrilla fights in the vanguard of a revolution.
He contended that the Cuban Revolution proved three fundamental
points: (1) that popular forces can win a war against an army; (2) that
it is not always necessary to wait for all the conditions for a revolution
to exist because the insurrectional focal will create them; and (3) that
in underdeveloped areas, the countryside must be the fundamental lo-
192. B. CROZIER, THE REBELS: A STUDY IN POSTWAR INSURRECTIONS (1960); Bell, Ireland:
The Dynamics of Insurgency, NEW SOCIETY, Nov. 25, 1971, at 1026.
193. B. CROZIER, supra note 192.
194. T. DRAPER, CASTRO'S REVOLUTION: MYTHS AND REALITIES I1 (1962).
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cale of the armed struggle.'" Insurrections should be waged in countries
which have the clear appearance of arbitrary government and abolition
of constitutional principles.
Regis Debray advanced the contention that Latin America was ripe
for revolution because the existing system was maintained solely by the
armed forces of the oligarchies in power which were supported by
United States imperialism. Debray felt that the problem was how to
destroy those forces and prepare the means for seizing power and con-
structing the new socialist society. Debray further contended that the
political task involved the development of seasoned political leadership,
following which the existing state should be drawn into the battle.'
According to him, the guerrilla struggle politicized the masses, ulti-
mately leading to the final act. Debray criticized traditional Communist
Party tactics which opposed violence.
In the Third World, disciples of Lenin adhere to the Leninist postu-
lates that the modern capitalist economy is based on imperialist control
and exploitation. They further accept the Leninist idea that a small
dedicated band of tightly organized revolutionary fighters should be at
the head of a rising movement or should comprise the midwives of mass
revolt. "I
Social revolution has become characteristic of the 20th century.
While the United States, Canada and Western Europe experienced rev-
olution in the 18th and 19th centuries, the nations of Eastern Europe,
Asia, Africa and Latin America had yet to undergo social revolution.
The revolutionary ideas of the Western countries influenced the intelli-
gensia in semifeudal societies. The sons of the lower and middle classes
could only advance through joining either the army or the bureaucracy,
both of which had become instruments to oppress the lower classes.
Alienation of the intellectuals was therefore to be anticipated; the result
has been the revolutionary ferment. With the exception of the Mexican
Revolution, the rise of the Kuomintang in China and the rise of Kemal
Ataturk, external events were utilized to gain power.'
Some revolutionaries, by applying Mao's theory that control of the
countryside through guerrilla activity leads to the fall of the cities, have
reasoned that control of the Third World will lead to the fall of the
195. T. DRAPER, CASTROISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1965).
196. R. DEBRAY, REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION (1967); L. HUBERMAN & P. SWEEZY,
REGIS DEBRAY AND THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1968).
197. Locquer, supra note 181.
198. H. SETON-WATSON, NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM 36-49 (1964).
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advanced and more urbanized nations. However, it is doubtful that
revolutionary domination of any Third World countries will have a
direct impact on such countries as the United States.'
The most recent phenomenon has been the rise of the urban guer-
rilla, as in Uruguay. The idea of urban guerrilla warfare has also had
proponents in the United States, ° where the most extreme forms of
such warfare have been the exploits of such groups as the Weathermen
faction of the Students for a Democratic Society.
IX. RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE PRACTICE OF REVOLUTION
As noted above, the 20th century has experienced a substantial
number of social revolutions. This section of the article will examine
some prominent instances of recent social revolution, starting with the
Mexican Revolution in 1910.
A. The Mexican Revolution
The first social revolution of the 20th century occurred in Mexico
in 1910 with the overthrow of the Diaz dictatorship. 0' Civil war then
wracked the country for ten years as the revolutionaries struggled
against supporters of the old regime. Dissension broke out among the
revolutionaries themselves. Though individual acts of brutality and
slaughter were common, widespread terror was seldom a feature. 02 The
revolution was the result of a variety of factors. Under Diaz, foreign
capital had come to dominate the country, which, in part, caused the
small middle class to experience frustration. Also, 90 percent of the
population was illiterate, the old order had become increasingly rigid
and the rate of progress had slowed.
The revolution began in 1910 with Francisco Madero's armed up-
rising against Diaz; by the spring of 1911, the dictatorship of Diaz had
collapsed. Madero established a provisional regime and conducted fair
elections. After his election to the presidency, Madero was unable to
maintain complete authority. He and his vice-president were over-
thrown and assassinated by the military coup of General Victoriano
Huerta. Thereafter, Huerta assumed the role of dictator. President Wil-
son refused to recognize the Huerta regime, but rather supported the
conservative Venustiano Carranza by sending troops into Mexico on
two occasions. Carranza was able to oust Huerta, but in 1920, Carranza
199. Locquer, supra note 181.
200. M. OPPENHEIMER, THE URBAN GUERRILLA (1969).
201. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 115.
202. Id.
[Vol. 7
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1972], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss1/1
DUE PROCESS
fell and was succeeded by Alvaro Obregon. Agitation and unrest flared
among the lower classes with the peasants being led by Emiliano Za-
pata. Though he was assassinated in 1919, Zapata's plan for the return
of the land to the villagers was formally adopted as a national policy
and included in the Constitution of 1917. Stability with only limited
reforms ensued during the 1920's. During the presidency of Lazaro
Cardenas in 1935, millions of acres of land were parcelled out to the
peasants, thereby ending the hacienda system. Labor was given a per-
manent position in national affairs and wage and health benefits were
raisedat0 In 1938, Cardenas nationalized the oil industry following a
bitter quarrel with its foreign owners. The nationalized oil industry
became one of the primary symbols of the Mexican Revolution and
Mexican nationalism." 4
Following Cardenas, Mexican presidents have followed a more
conservative line, stressing economic growth. Though the reform pro-
grams have continued, a disproportionately great share of the new
wealth has accrued to the business community and commercial farm
operators. While overall living standards have risen, the lot of the peas-
antry is still wretched and the gap between rich and poor has widened.
The United States involved itself in the Mexican Revolution. Al-
though President Taft favored the Diaz regime, he quickly recognized
Madero, who had been supported and assisted by the sympathetic bor-
der population. After Madero took the reins of government, the United
States Ambassador to Mexico opposed Madero and sought to under-
mine Washington's confidence in his administration. Although his exact
role in the fall of Madero's government is disputable, the Ambassador
did support Huerta, who led the coup and succeeded to power. President
Taft held up diplomatic recognition of Huerta's regime until his presi-
dency expired. Taft's successor, Wilson, felt that Huerta symbolized all
that was wrong with Latin American governments; nevertheless, he
offered to mediate between Huerta and Carranza. Wilson desired to
persuade Huerta to hold an election in which Huerta would be ousted;0 5
when these efforts failed, Wilson lifted the arms embargo in force
against Mexico and then used a minor incident involving United States
naval forces in Tampico harbor to justify United States military occupa-
tion of Veracruz. The port was Huerta's main source of revenue; with
it occupied, Huerta weakened and subsequently fled the country. Wilson
thereafter withdrew his forces from Veracruz.
203. Id. at 121-24.
204. Id. at 125.
205. Id. at 133.
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After some indecision, Wilson recognized Carranza as de facto
president. Despite Mexican attacks on United States citizens and a
punitive United States military expedition into Mexico in 1916, rela-
tions between the two countries remained fairly stable. When Obregon
overthrew Carranza, Wilson left the matter for his successor, Warren
G. Harding. Disputes over claims and property rights growing out of
the revolution continued to plague United States-Mexican relations
until the late 1930's; the most serious issue was Mexico's expropriation
of the oil industry in 1938.201
B. Turkey
Turkey had experienced, prior to World War I, a revolutionary
uprising against the Sultan in the 19th century and the Young Turk
Uprising in 1908.207 Following World War I, when Istanbul was occu-
pied by allied troops, Mustefa Kemal Pasha revolted against the Sultan.
Kemal, a general who had been sent to the interior, consolidated his
troops and challenged his government to demand the end of foreign
occupation. He also demanded the convening of regional and national
conferences to determine the future of a new nationalistic Turkey. A
congress which demanded, among other things, the creation of a na-
tional assembly was convened in Siva. Frightened by these moves, the
government resigned and a new government was created. Although the
new government created a national assembly, the existence of such a
chamber was short lived because of the intervention of allied troops.
Shortly afterwards, a Grand National Assembly was convened in An-
kara with Kemal at the helm. The Turks succeeded in expelling the
Greek troops and forced the allied powers to recognize the nationalist
government of the General Assembly. Invitations to the Lausanne
Peace Conference were sent to both the nationalist government and to
what remained of the Sultan's regime. Kemal reacted to this affront by
deposing the Sultan. At the Lausanne Peace Conference, a treaty was
signed re-establishing the complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty
in almost all the territory included in the present Turkish Republic. 208
206. Id.
207. The modern Turkish revolutionary period began with the overthrow of the Sultan,
Abdul Aziz, in 1876. He was succeeded by Murad V, thought to be a supporter of constitution-
alism, but who shortly went insane. Under Abdul Hamid 11 the country returned to despotism. B.
LEwis, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY (1961). In 1889, a group of army students formed
a society, which later came to be comprised of the Young Turks, and forced the Sultan to restore
the old constitution in 1908. The Sultan was deposed by the society in 1909. In 1913, Enver Bey
overthrew the constitutional government in a coup and was dominant until the end of World War
I. E. RAMSUAR, THE YOUNG TURKS: PRELUDE TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1908 (1957).
208. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 141-45.
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The Capitulations, long resented by Turks as a symbol of inferiority and
subservience, were absolished. Thus Turkey, alone among the defeated
powers of World War I, was successful in rising from her own ruins and
in rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by the victors.
Kemal, after his victory over the Greeks, faced no serious challenge
to his leadership. During this period, he instituted wide ranging reforms
and encouraged opposition parties. 09 He abolished the Caliphate, reli-
gious education and religious orders. He pressed for Western clothing
and Westernized the country with the adoption of the Gregorian calen-
dar, the Swiss Civil Code and penal and commercial codes based upon
European models. At that time he took the name of Ataturk.
Under Kemal, the ideology was based on several principles: repub-
licanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism and revolutionism.
The first three concepts are self-explanatory. Populism meant the de-
struction of privilege and re-emphasis of individual equality of oppor-
tunity. Statism denoted the intervention of the state to promote eco-
nomic development, while revolutionism signified that the revolution
was meant to be a continuing one. 10
In honest elections in 1950, the opposition party, the DP, assumed
power. Though initially popular, once in control the party became op-
pressive and stifled opposition parties. In response to the oppression, the
army initiated a coup in 1960, arresting the DP leaders. The army junta,
termed the National Unity Commission, initiated reforms., A new
constitution which stressed individual rights was adopted and a constitu-
tional court to check political parties and the constitutionality of legisla-
tion was established.
In the period of 1960-61, the army held gigantic trials of former
DP leaders. A total of 592 persons were charged with crimes; their trials
were attended by 1068 witnesses and 150,000 spectators. The govern-
ment requested the death penalty 228 times, but had its request granted
in only 15 instances. Three of these 15 defendants were eventually exe-
cuted. Also, life imprisonment was imposed on 31 of those brought to
trial; lesser prison terms were given to 402; and 133 of the former
members of the party were able to win acquittals. 12 The principal defen-
dants were the former President, Celal Bayar, the former Prime Minis-
ter, Adnan Menderes, and various cabinet members. Though most of
209. Id. at 143-44.
210. Id. at 135.
211. W. WEIKER, THE TURKISH REVOLUTION 1960-1961 (1963).
212. Id. at 28.
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the charges involved such serious offenses as inciting riots, destruction
of newspapers and corruption of elections, some charges were ridicu-
lous, e.g., that President Bayar had forced a Turkish zoo to purchase a
dog that had been a state gift to him from the Afghan government.
These former leaders were sentenced to death, but later the sentences
were commuted to life imprisonment. A popular demand for amnesty
arose and, by 1966, most of the defendants, including Bayar, were re-
leased. 1 3
The National Unity Commission called for elections to return the
government to civilian control in 1961. Four political parties entered
those elections. A coalition government was formed because no party
was able to garner a majority.
Recently, because of student unrest which has been marked by the
kidnapping and murder of the Israeli Consulate General, the army has
pressured the Turkish Parliament to assert more authoritarian con-
trol.2" A split has developed between the Justice Party, which represents
the more conservative farm elements and the religious groups, and other
army supported groups which seek modernization. The army, although
dissatisfied with the speed of reform, does not seek to remove the civil-
ian leaders and itself rule directly. Essentially, the struggle is over the
type of government Turkey is to have in the future.
The external impact of the Turkish Revolution has been minimal
although attempts were made to emulate the Turkish model in Iran and
Afghanistan."'
C. China
The most significant post-world War II revolution was the assump-
tion of power by the Communist regime in China. In essence, it was a
continuation of an earlier revolution. Partly because the cities had come
under foreign control by the beginning of the 20th century, a strong
nationalist sentiment developed and led to the overthrow of the Manchu
dynasty. The Communist Party, although not then in power, thrived in
the cities during the 1920's and for a time was aligned with Chiang Kai
Shek and the ruling Kuomintang. A split then occurred and Chiang
drove the Communists to resort to a guerrilla campaign. The central
factor which enabled the Communists to assume power was the Japa-
213. Id. ch. 2.
214. The Generals of Turkey Give "Last Chance" to Parliament, MAARIV, Nov. 14, 1971,
at 12 (in Hebrew).
215. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 154-55.
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nese invasion which caused the weakening of the Kuomintang position.
By the same token, the invasion strengthened the Communists and its
aftermath led to their ultimate victory."t 6 When the revolution lost its
force in the 1960's, Mao attempted to maintain its fervor through the
Red Purge, which was an attempt to rally the masses to adherence to
revolutionary principles by the purging of moderate or conservative
elements from public life. The attempt did not fully succeed and the
army was able to reassert its position."7 The full significance of the
Chinese Revolution is yet to unfold.
D. Egypt
A significant Middle Eastern revolution unfolded in Egypt.
Through most of that country's recent history, Britain has played a
major role. In 1882, Britain occupied Egypt and, by the beginning of
World War I, had established a protectorate. Although Egypt formally
became independent in 1922, Britain continued to exercise considerable
influence in part through the retention of its armed forces on Egyptian
soil.
In general, Egyptian politics have not been marked by much viol-
ence although some riots, demonstrations and assassinations have oc-
curred. For example, the most notorious incident of bloodshed occurred
in 1906-the Denshaway Incident-when British officers engaged in
pigeon hunting were molested by villagers. In the ensuing melee, one
villager and one officer were killed while other villagers were wounded.
A state of panic in the British community resulted. The incident ended
when the guilty villagers were severely punished. Also, in a 1952 inci-
dent, British troops battled Egyptian police in the Canal Zone, resulting
in 43 Egyptian deaths. The next day, the worst riot in Egyptian history
occurred as mobs took over Cairo, burning and looting foreign shops
and establishments, including the famous Shepherd's Hotel.'"
The revolution which changed Egypt's modern history took place
during the reign of King Farouk. The King's authoritative position had
been gradually weakened by general governmental corruption and by
Egypt's loss of the 1948 war to Israel. Consequently, in the summer of
1952, a small band of junior army officers under the leadership of
Colonel Abdul Nasser was able to effectuate a swift coup. The insurgent
216. Solomon, The Characteristics of the Chinese Revolution, in THE NATURE OF REVOLU-
TION, supra note 150. Professor Brinton stated that the Chinese Revolution appears to be develop-
ing the same pattern as did the Mexican. id. at 13-14.
217. Medzini, Book Review, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 12, 1971, (Magazine Section), at 12.
218. T. LITTLE, EGYPT (1958).
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army group was backed by the popular Major General Mohammed
Naguib, who joined the band in requesting former Prime Minister Ali
Maher Pasha to form a new government. In response to this situation,
the King conceded and was persuaded to abdicate. Subsequently, Gen-
eral Naguib replaced Ali Maher as Prime Minister and Egypt was
proclaimed a republic. 19 Little bloodshed occurred in the wake of the
coup. 0
The most important factor in promoting the coup was the British
presence. Britain continued openly to occupy the country despite the
granting of independence in 1922 and the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty of 1936, which called for the diminution of the British role. In
1942, for example, the British Ambassador ordered King Farouk's pal-
ace surrounded by tanks in order to force the King to dismiss one
government and form another. After World War II, British forces re-
tired to the Canal Zone, but their presence remained threatening. Egyp-
tian nationalism was continually frustrated." 1 The Muslim Brother-
hood, therefore, emerged preaching return to the purity of Islam and a
rejection of all foreign influences. In addition, Egypt at that time was a
land of economic frustration and misery-peasants and workers had
little, while in contrast, a small group of rich absentee landowners and
industrialists thrived, removed from the masses. Furthermore, corrup-
tion prevailed in all walks of life.32 All of these factors coalesced to
assist the insurgents.
Following the coup, a power struggle occurred between Naguib and
Nasser with the latter emerging triumphant. Nasser began to institute
changes in the old system, including the suppression of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the suspension of parliamentary government and free
elections. Social reforms were instituted; e.g., land reform was begun
and eventually destroyed the economic base of the former ruling class.
The Suez Canal was nationalized and became an important source of
foreign exchange until the events of June 1957.223 Following the Bri-
tish, French and Israeli invasion, foreign properties were sequestered.
In 1960, an economic nationalization program was instituted. Finally a
new revolutionary party was formed.2 4
The ideology of the revolution, as expressed in the National
219. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 157-60.
220. Id. at 160.
221. M. ZAYID, EGYPT'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (1965).
222. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 164-66.
223. Id. at 166-69.
224. Id.
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Charter, set forth the guiding principles of the movement. These princi-
ples included the "[d]estruction of imperialism and its stooges among
Egyptian traitors," the "[e]nding [of] feudalism," the "[e]nding [of]
monopoly and the domination of capital over government," the
"[e]stablishment of social justice," the "[b]uilding of a powerful na-
tional army," and the "[e]stablishment of a sound democratic govern-
ment." The Charter emphasized that these principles could be imple-
mented because the national struggle had created "[a] will for revolu-
tionary change," "[a] revolutionary vanguard," "[a] deep consciousness
of history and its effect on contemporary man on the one hand and of
the ability of man in turn to influence history on the other," "[a] mind
open to all human experiences, from which it benefits and to which it
contributes with no fanaticism or complex," and "[u]nshakable faith in
God, His Prophets and His sacred messages which He passed on to man
as a guide to justice and righteousness." Socialism and nationalism were
proclaimed. "The war on imperialism and domination" was to be con-
tinued. 2 1
Nasser developed charisma; until his death, he towered over all
other Arab leaders. Because of the overwhelming difficulty in solving
domestic problems, Nasser engaged in international adventures. He
exacerbated the conflict with Israel leading to Egyptian defeats in 1956
and 1967. He also became involved in a meaningless conflict in Yemen.
Since Nasser's death, the revolution appears to be assuming a new
course under Anwar Sadat's leadership.226
E. Cuba
The recent revolution which has had the greatest effect on the
United States took place in Cuba. Violence has long marked Cuban
politics; the Cuban government during Batista's reign had rested on
force. 227 Typical prerevolutionary conditions existed in pre-Castro
Cuba: a small depressed peasantry, particularly in Oriente Province; a
large urban lower class on the margin of existence; an unstable, inse-
225. Id. at 178. For an analysis, see Baha Abu-Laban, The National Character of the
Egyptian Revolution, I J. OF DEVELOPING AREAS 179 (1967); P. O'BRIEN, THE REVOLUTION IN
EGYPT'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM 199-214 (1966).
226. Mansfield, Egypt After Nasser, THE WORLD TODAY, June 1971, at 302. A significant
development was the conspiracy trial of revolutionary figures for plotting the overthrow of the
regime. Most prominent among the defendants were former Vice President Ali Sabry and former
War Minister Mohammed Fawzi; both were sentenced to life imprisonment. Eight of the accused
were said to have been acquitted and a number of others were given light sentences. Jerusalem
Post, Dec. 10, 1971, at 1, col. I.
227. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMrrT, supra note 140, at 184; Stokes, National and Local Violence
in Cuban Politics, 34 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 62 (1953).
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cure, violence-prone middle class seeking to imitate middle'class modes
of life; and middle and upper classes that seemed almost totally obli-
vious to lower class problems. The government was dictatorial and
ridden by corruption; education and health programs were elite-
oriented; and many vital sectors of the economy were controlled by
foreign interests.28 Intellectuals and political leaders had long resented
United States domination. Public opinion, though disapproving of the
Batista regime, was generally apathetic.
In 1956, Castro prepared to invade Cuba with assistance from
exiles in the United States. He planned to use an old yacht, the Granma.
In the meantime, a group of armed partisans, not knowing that the
Castro group was at sea, arose in revolt in Santiago. At the same time,
students struck the University of Havana. These revolts were quickly
crushed. Forewarned, military units spotted the Granma and killed or
captured all but twelve of Castro's original complement. This remnant
fled to the mountains of Cuba where Fidel and his brother Raul organ-
ized a guerrilla campaign. Some resistance to Batista developed in the
cities, but there was never a mass movement. Castro's continuing revolt
forced Batista to desperate acts of suppression. Only in 1958 did a
widespread disintegration of the elite occur. The success of the revolu-
tion lay in the ability of Castro and his band to drive the dictator to
desperation.
The revolution entered a moderate phase when Castro assumed
power. A civilian cabinet composed of old time Batista opponents was
created, but the real power lay with the rebel army. Batista's supporters
were completely eliminated from the government, and some of the more
notorious officials were tried before Revolutionary Tribunals. Hundreds
met summary execution. Worldwide and national disapproval of the
trials forced their discontinuance in May 1959.
The legal basis of the new regime was the Constitution of 1940, as
amended by the Fundamental Law of February 1959. In effect, the
social and economic provisions remained in force while the political
sections were "temporarily" held in abeyance. By the end of May, a
period of radicalization had taken place-the Agrarian Reform Law
was enacted, the Communist People's Socialist Party (PSP) emerged as
the only legal political party, the labor union leadership was purged and
replaced by Communists, and the 26th of July movement was down-
graded because it contained strong anti-Communist elements. The mod-
erates in the cabinet were replaced by radical leftists, some of whom had
228. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 186-89.
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been PSP members. In 1962, Castro turned against the old line PSP
leadership.29
A significant achievement of the revolution has been the elimina-
tion of illiteracy, though academic training was accompanied by indoc-
trination. There has been vast and rapid redistribution of the national
wealth. Beginning with the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1959, land
has been progressively nationalized and organized into state collective
farms. Most domestic and foreign-owned businesses have been expro-
priated, as has been the property of the upper and middle class families.
In addition, the regime has embarked on a program of planning, indus-
trialization and diversification. However, goals have failed to be met
and retrenchment has ensued.230
Tensions with the United States arose, at first as a result of the
summary trials and executions. Later, relations began to decline seri-
ously because of the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law. Hostil-
ity between the United States and Cuba was accompanied by Cuba's
rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Stages in the shift of Cuba's
alignment progressed from the Cuban confiscation of property to the
United States abolition of the Cuban sugar cane quota, the renewal of
Cuban-Soviet diplomatic relations and, finally, to the inauguration of
Cuban-Soviet trade agreements. The shift in alignment resulted in the
breaking of diplomatic relations with the United States and the abortive
Bay of Pigs invasion. A factor which further aggravated United States-
Cuban relations was Castro's desire to spread his revolution to the Latin
American continent.2 31
Whether Castro was initially a Communist is a matter of conjec-
ture. Theodore Draper has contended that, though Castro had made
contact with the Communists in seeking support for his revolution, he
probably adopted the Communist ideology only after assuming power
in order to justify his revolution. He needed a program and the Com-
munists provided one. 32 Actually the Cuban Communist Party had
supported Batista. Castro's famous "History Will Absolve Me" speech
at his trial was moderate in tone calling only for a return to constitu-
tional liberty and limited reforms.3 There is evidence that Castro
229. Id. at 189-95.
230. Id. at 195.
231. Id. at 200-02; B. GOLDENBERG, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND LATIN AMERICA (1965).
232. T. DRAPER, supra note 194. Castro's ideology has been characterized as a program of
social reform well within the framework of traditional left wing ideology. B. GOLDENBERG, supra
note 231. at 6.
233. T. DRAPER, supra note 194, at 13-14.
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adopted a more radical attitude in his subsequent guerrilla days.2
Gradually, he became more committed to a radical program. By the
summer of 1959, Castro and the Communists' formed an alliance; later,
this alliance became a fusion. In retrospect, Castro has formulated a
program of social reform within the framework of traditional left-wing
ideology .2 1
The Cuban Revolution has led to a power rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union involving them in the missile con-
frontation and in an ongoing rivalry in the Caribbean. Castro, convinced
that he could not achieve his revolutionary goals without breaking from
United States domination, turned to the Soviet Union. The latter as-
sumed a power position from which it could offer economic and military
assistance. Castro was able to solicit such aid successfully without upset-
ting the Cuban people because of the rising nationalism and anticoloni-
alism-sentiments which have deeply affected Latin Americans. Ac-
cordingly, the United States has found that it can no longer brandish
the big stick. United States action-the Bay of Pigs invasion, the missile
confrontation and the Dominican Republic intervention-demonstrated
United States concern with security as opposed to adverse public opin-
ion which results from intervention. These events indicate some circum-
stances in which the United States will tolerate no actual or potential
interference from outside the hemisphere. Since the missile crisis, rela-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union have settled into
a pattern. The United States is embargoing virtually all trade with Cuba
and is pressuring its allies to limit their commercial exchanges. The
Soviet Union therefore continues as the island's primary trading part-
ner.
236
Both because of American pressure and because of Castro's
avowed policy of supporting paramilitary activity in various Latin
American countries, Cuba was expelled from the Organization of
American States and most of the Latin American states have broken
relations with her. Recently, however, this pattern was broken with
Chile's resumption of diplomatic relations and Castro's visit to that
country .37
234. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 198. Castroism has been describd as "a
leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power, and power in search of an
ideology." T. DRAPER, supra note 195, at 132-33.
235. B. GOLDENBERG, supra note 231.
236. C. LEIDEN & K. SCHMITT, supra note 140, at 200-02; D. BURKS, CUBA UNDER CASTRO
22, 44-45 (1964).
237. Jerusalem Post, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5.
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Castro's support of violent revolutionary action has run counter to




Revolution has also occurred behind the Iron Curtain. Unrest in
East Germany and Poland were instrumental in producing a revolution
in Hungary in 1956.21 A rift had developed between the Communist
regime led by the Stalinist-inclined Racozik and the people who ex-
pressed strong nationalist sentiments. Passive resistance by the peas-
antry forced out the old regime and led to the emergence of Imre Nagy.
However, the agitation began to snowball and in October 1956, sponta-
neous mass armed rebellion erupted. The" participants engaged in brick
throwing in front of the central headquarters of the national broadcast-
ing office and the police responded by hurling tear gas. Both sides fired
shots and suffered casualties. At first, the mobs had no thought of
bringing down the government; however, the harsh and uncompromis-
ing stand of the officialdom, coupled with a bayonet charge by the
police, ignited a general conflagration.2 0 Within a matter of hours, the
rebels gained control of the city and, as the news spread through the
countryside, the Communist Party simply melted away while local
groups assumed control with little violence. Only after the revolution
had been won did its leaders, particularly Imre Nagy, assume com-
mand. As a mass uprising, almost leaderless in its initial attack, the
Hungarian Revolution was an astonishingly complete success. It was
crushed only with he overwhelming weight of foreign armed force.2I
The Russian armed intervention was dictated by concerns of power
politics rather than by the fate of one group or another in Hungary. The
lasting victory of the revolution in Hungary would have threatened the
stability of the other satellite regimes; also, a Hungary allied with the
West would have adversely affected Soviet security interests. Moreover,
any American intervention or counterintervention would likewise have
been dictated by something other than an abstract attachment to the
liberation of peoples subjected to Communist control.
The Soviet intervention and the accompanying Western apathy
238. Burks, Soviet Policy for Castro's Cuba, in EXPLOSIVE FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA (J.
TePaske & S. Fisher eds. 1964).
239. For accounts of the Hungarian Revolution, see generally A. HELLER, No MORE
COMRADES (1957); F. VAL], RIFT AND REVOLT IN HUNGARY (1961); P. ZINNER, REVOLUTION IN
HUNGARY (1962).
240. P. ZINNER, supra note 239, at 238, 243, 360.
241. Id. at 349.
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reoriented the thinking of the peoples of Eastern Europe by demonstrat-
ing the national and international limits for the challenging of Commun-
ist domination. Amelioration of the satellite condition could only be
achieved through the tacit consent of Moscow. Eastern Europe was thus
pacified .42
The Hungarian Revolution was of further significance in that it
demonstrated that even a totalitarian regime was vulnerable to revolu-
tion . 3 In 1848, Marx contended that a revolution should have the
philosopher at its head and the proletariat as its heart. In 1956, this
dream became a reality; the intellectual struggled for the right to truth
and the proletariat sought the right to freedom-the real freedom of the
working class. Together they defeated a despotism supported by a for-
eign power. As in 1848, nationalism was combined with liberalism.2 ,
The Hungarian Revolution was essentially a rebellion of Commun-
ist Party members.'A The struggle was for freedom to seek truth and a
return to the ideals of 19th century liberalism.24 1 It was a reaction
against the purge trials of the Stalinist Hungarian regime in an effort
to establish a regime based on truth and on principles of due process.
G. Czechoslovakia
In 1968, Russian tanks again rolled into a neighboring country,
Czechoslovakia, and once again the West reacted apathetically. Liberal-
izing pressures had forced the Stalinist-minded Novotny to resign. He
was succeeded by Dubcek, a liberal Communist who attempted to intro-
duce liberal reforms leading to humanistic socialism. More rights were
granted to the people and economic reforms which called for the decen-
tralization of industry were introduced. There were hints that expression
would be permitted to non-Communists. At the same time, the Czech
regime carefully sought to stress its attachment to the Soviet orbit. It
did not seek to establish any particular relationships with the West.247
To a Trotskyite writer, the situation in Czechoslovakia represented
a struggle for change. Yugoslav methods were adapted to the situation
with greater freedom intended for the worker than in Yugoslavia.2 8 The
242. Id.
243. Aron, The Meaning of Destiny, in TEN YEARS AFTER (T. Aczel ed. 1966).
244. Id.
245. Polyani, The Message of the Hungarian Revolution, in TEN YEARS AFTER (T. Aczel
ed. 1966).
246. Id.
247. P. WINDSOR & A. ROBERTS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968: REFORM REPRESSION AND
RESISTANCE (1969).
248. Frank, Czechoslovakia, in NEw REVOLUTIONARIES 159-75 (T. Ali ed. 1969).
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bureaucratic rule was threatened when mass support developed, pressing
Dubcek for broader reform. The people were not content with mere
liberalization at the whim of the leader or party functionary. The change
had significant repercussions in Eastern Europe, threatening the very
existence of the bureaucratic power structure and, therefore, necessitat-
ing Soviet intervention to preserve the status quo. The cause for the
intervention was not against a non-existent danger of return of capital-
ism but against the situation in which the Kremlin could clearly see the
beginning of an anti-bureaucratic revolutionary struggle not in its inter-
est.
The Soviet intervention may seem mystifying in light of the careful
efforts the Czech regime undertook to keep away from Western entan-
glements. However, the reforms appeared to threaten the stability of the
neighboring governments. Moreover, the Soviet Union feared that the
liberalization might eventually lead to Czechoslovakia's turning West-
ward, particularly towards Western Germany-an eventuality which,
because of security considerations, the Russians could not permit.20
The Czech Revolution is particularly notable because of the appar-
ently spontaneous passive resistance and surge of national sentiment
following the Soviet occupation. This resistance proved quite effective
in frustrating Soviet aims at the start of the occupation and in forcing
the Soviets to permit Dubcek to reassume power for a time.211 Signifi-
cantly, non-violent techniques, rather than violence and terror-
ism-which are self-defeating in the long run-were effectively adapted
as the means of revolt.
H. Worldwide Revolution
In recent years there has been, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, a
growing worldwide revolt against authority, particularly among the
young. One writer has characterized this development as a revolt against
anti-humanistic institutions and modes of conduct and thought.21 2 The
humanist idea, as derived from the Renaissance, conceives of the indi-
vidual as autonomous in his self-expression when existing in a harmoni-
ous order.
Some believed that advances in technology and modernization it-
249. Id. at 174-75.
250. See P. WINDSOR & A. ROBERTS, supra note 247.
251. Id.; see also R. LITrEL, THE CZECH BLACKBOOK (1969); H. SCHWARTZ, PRAGUE'S 200
DAYS (1969).
252. Benson, The Irrepressible World Revolt, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 8, 1969, at 10.
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self would both lead to subjugation of the individual by bureaucratic and
authoritarian controls. However, recent revolts and protests may well
have challenged these assumptions. For example, the downfall of the
Stalinist Party Secretary Novotny in Czechoslovakia, the 1968 McCar-
thy campaign in the United States, the near overthrow of President
DeGaulle in France, the beginning of intellectual ferment in the Soviet
Union and the campus uprisings worldwide all point to a refusal by the
individual to succumb to these new pressures.
By its very nature, modernization functions as a liberating force.
Bureaucratic institutions develop to a climax and then are toppled with
the toppling of one system leading domino-like to the toppling of others.
Since 1945, a worldwide desire to gain the benefits of the scientific
revolution has existed. With these scientific developments, greater ef-
forts to secure human rights have taken place. The struggle has ex-
pressed itself in various forms of protest and revolt and may encounter
temporary reverses, such as in Hungary, Greece, Brazil, Korea and
Spain or as in the return of suppression in Czechoslovakia. Protest has
dramatically emerged in the Soviet Union with the emergence of an
underground press and other modes of expression.253 The recent and
continuing efforts of the Russian Jews to emigrate may be regarded as
another expression of this protest.
Revolutions generally have transnational effect. The symbolism of
one revolt is often reflected in another, e.g., the images of Guevara and
Ho Chi Minh. This has been demonstrated by the student revolts in
many countries .2  Indeed, in many countries the college student has
been the catalyst for protest and revolt. Increasing student unrest and
the rise of the New Left both indicate a growing protest against the
bureaucratic depersonalization of the university as well as against other
aspects of contemporary society. This form of protest reacts against
affluent materialism and the machine. Only a minority, seeking to stim-
ulate the masses to protest against the evils remaining in society, may
participate in revolt. One continuing issue of protest has been the fact
that minority groups have not yet joined the ranks of the relatively
affluent and are not yet a part of the establishment. The protesters also
seek to dramatize the immorality of tolerating evil, viz., segregation,
violence in Viet Nam and the threat of thermonuclear annihilation.
253. A. BRUMBERG, IN QUEST OF JUSTICE: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY (1970); M. HAYWARD & W. FLETCHER, RELIGION AND THE SOVIET STATE: A DILEMMA
OF POWER (1969).
254. Kutner, Habeas Scholastica: An Ombudsman For Academic Due Process-A
Proposal, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 110 (1968).
[Vol. 7
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1972], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss1/1
DUE PROCESS
X. REVOLUTION AND DUE PROCESS
In some societies, the conditions may be such as to lead to a revolu-
tion; in others, it is possible- provided the established institutions are
responsive-to initiate reforms.21S But protest continues. The challenge
is to provide responsive institutions at both the municipal and interna-
tional levels. The proposal for World Habeas Corpus fits into this
framework by providing legal redress for expression of individual pro-
test.
Clearly, the potential for revolt is universal. The boundary between
international and internal war is vague, and the predilection for external
involvement in internal wars has transcended historical epochs. 26 An
affinity exists between internal and intetnational violence. The rebels
may seek redress in the establishment of a new order which will also
challenge the equilibrium of the international system.
Within the next few years, the prospects for an internal or civil war
in various countries (e.g., India, Spain, Cyprus) are greater than are the
prospects of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States.5 7
Revolution threatens domestic society as much as war threatens the
international. While the contention has been that a domestic society is
more capable of preventing its subjects from committing destructive
violence than the international society, this has not been borne out by
recent events.?8 At one time major rivalry in world affairs was under-
taken primarily by warfare between states; now it has suddenly become
a matter of warfare within states. The old doctrines of international law
concerning intervention and belligerency have lost relevance. New
objective tests must be devised. 259 A supranational authority must regu-
late intervention.
Revolution, in seeking change, challenges the international law. A
particular tension is created with regard to human rights. On the one
hand, suppression of acts of rebellion, particularly terrorist acts, in-
volves the abrogation of human rights. On the other hand, when the new
regime attains power. it, too, tends to abrogate certain human rights to
maintain power vis-a-vis the adherents of the old regime. In this sit-
uation, the rights of the individual-particularly the procedural
rights-are infringed. In such circumstances, the chances are much
255. W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION (1970).
256. G. KELLY & L. MILLER, INTERNAL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS (1969).
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greater that the individual will be arbitrarily detained. At the same time,
the effectiveness of a system of World Habeas Corpus tribunals would
be placed under strain. A regime bent on maintaining its position might
be less inclined to respond to Writs of World Habeas Corpus. If, how-
ever, a World Habeas Corpus tribunal were to react timidly in such an
instance, its credibility would be compromised.
Accordingly, when a government is threatened or unable to main-
tain order, it is inclined to suspend principles of due process. The chal-
lenge to a regime might well give rise to what has been termed the
"political trial" wherein the accused is characterized as a villain and a
gangster, a person bent on the destruction of the established order while
partisans of the accused characterize the regime as evil and oppressive.
In such a trial, procedures for due process might be trampled upon.
Due process, on the other hand, is indivisible. It cannot be conven-
iently manipulated to suit one's purposes. A denial of due process in
some instances erodes established liberty and opens the breach for tyr-
anny, threatening all. As one writer noted:
Whatever his convictions, be they extremist or moderate,
left wing or right wing, every man is exposed to the threat of
arbitrary judgment, of acts or procedures which are contrary
to the fundamental rules guaranteeing the values which alone
make life worth living.
Even those who scorn these principles may one day owe
their own safety to them.260
The detention without due process of alleged terrorists in Northern
Ireland or the mass execution of alleged Communists in Indonesia and
the Sudan cannot be viewed with equanimity by the international
community. The validity of verdicts in political trials in which proce-
dures of due process are trampled upon, as in Leningrad and Broges, is
highly questionable. The reactions against such trials result not from
political, but from human, motivations.
As a prophylactic measure to assure adherence to principles of due
process, arrangements should be made to assure the presence of outside
observers at political trials. Such observers could be sent by such organi-
zations as the International Commission of Jurists or Amnesty Interna-
tional or by the Human Rights Commission. Representatives of a pro-
posed World Habeas Corpus tribunal could attend such proceedings.
260. Martin-Achard, Political Trials and Observers, 6 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS 24, 36 (Apr.-June, 1971).
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The observers would, prior to the trial, meet with the judge, the prose-
cuting and defense counsels, the accused and the investigating officials.
An investigation would be made to assure that the accused had been
extended adequate pre-trial due process procedures. The observers
would also attend the trial to see that it was fairly conducted.26' Observ-
ers might be permitted as a matter of national courtesy.
Clearly, in an emergency situation, principles of due process may
have to be adapted ,to the needs of security. Article 15 of the European
Human Rights Convention permits derogation of its provisions in times
of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Article 4 of the
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights likewise provides for detention
under emergency conditions. However, as a report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee of the Right of Everyone to be Free From Arbitrary Arrest and
Detention of the Human Rights Commission has indicated, the need for
the application of emergency procedures should be clearly established,
and those exercising the authority to make the decision regarding indi-
vidual detention should be independent from the police and the mili-
tary.262
Even in emergency situations, those elements of due process essen-
tial to ordered liberty must be retained. Article 14 of the Covenant on
Political and Civil Rights provides the basis for procedural due process:
that the accused be promptly informed of the charges against him; that
he have adequate opportunity to prepare his defense; that he be tried
by his peers; that, absent special circumstances, he be tried in the
presence of his accusers; and that he or his counsel have the opportunity
to confront and cross examine them. Nevertheless. due process "is not
261. Martin-Achard, supra note 260.
262. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary
Arrest and Detention to the Human Rights Commission, 26 INT'L REV. OF CRIM. POLICY (1968).
In suppressing acts of rebellion or terrorism by detention, the governing authority may also
resort to torture as a means of obtaining intelligence information. This has been practiced in
Greece, Brazil, India, Northern Ireland and Viet Nam. In Greece and India, the practice of beating
prisoners on the heels is followed. Hern, Interrogation Methods Around the World, The Times
(London), Nov. 18, 1971, at 5. In Viet Nam, Viet Cong prisoners are tortured by the South
Vietnamese. The Green Berets carried out interrogation through operation Phoenix. Id. In South
Africa, in accordance with the terrorism act under which police are authorized to detain anyone
indefinitely without charge, 20 people have died while being interrogated during detention. Police
claimed that they were unaware even of the existence of these persons and the press in South Africa
has been forbidden to publish anything whatsoever relating to these arrests. The deaths have
occurred under strange circumstances, such as that of the death of a man found hanging in a cell
by a belt; the man's wife stated that he was not wearing a belt when arrested. Another man
allegedly fell from a window. Levin, South Africa's Power to Abuse Power, The Times (London),
Dec. 9, 1971, at 14.
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a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstance." ' Due process represents "a profound attitude of fair-
ness between man and man, and more particularly between the individ-
ual and government. 2 4 Accordingly, a tribunal, in applying principles
of due process, should consider
[t]he precise nature of the interest that has been adversely
affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for
doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was
followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary
whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained
of and good accomplished-these are some of the considera-
tions that must enter into the judicial judgment.2 15
Where, as in Northern Ireland or in Gaza, an individual accused
of terrorist activity may not be told some of the details of the charges
against him nor the identity of his accusers because of security consider-
ations, the question of whether such evidence must be kept confidential
might properly be a matter of judicial determination. The judge should
have access to the confidential information in chambers to determine
whether, or to what extent, it may be conveyed to the accused. The judge
would weigh the security interests involved and would establish proce-
dures to convey the information to the accused or his counsel in a
manner that would not compromise the security of the state.
Both international observers of trials and tribunals of World Ha-
beas Corpus would accordingly apply standards of due process. Norms
of conduct essential to maintain ordered liberty would be the prime
standard. An inquiry would be made, with due regard to the particular
situation and to the principles of the established legal system, as to
whether there was adherence to the standards of fairness. For the pro-
ceedings to be offered the imprimatur of the tribunal, the regime must
have manifested a sensitivity to due process.
XI. CONCLUSION
Revolution is a continuing phenomenon in the modern world. The
question is not whether this phenomenon is to be approved or disap-
proved. Such an attitude is akin to King Canute's ordering the tide to
reverse its course. Revolutions are to be anticipated in many countries
263. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 163.
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throughout the world: Egypt, Iraq, the Sudan, Morocco, Paraguay,
Greece, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and a host of other countries. Prerevo-
lutionary conditions exist in many parts of the world.
Revolutions threaten international peace. In a state of revolution,
rebellion and anarchy, human rights cannot prevail. Though the concept
of human rights focuses upon the individual and his relationship to the
state, limiting the authority of the sovereign, a framework of rational
authority is essential. The absence of either social order or authority
negates the concept of human rights.211 In a revolutionary situation, the
notion of World Habeas Corpus or of due process is meaningless. An-
archy leads to the rule of the jungle-not to human rights. Human
dignity is negated. Such an order may well be conducive to the triumph
of unlimited authority-tyranny and the police state, which are in them-
selves threats to peace."7
Man, from time immemorial, has been concerned with the problem
of authority. As indicated in ancient Egyptian inscriptions, in the classic
writings of the Greeks and later, in the Middle Ages, as well as by
modern philosophers, legitimate authority is not to be lightly over-
thrown. To the ancients it was an act of impiety. Nevertheless, circum-
stances very probably will arise-and, indeed, have arisen-where such
revolt is to be justified. The tyrant who flaunts the principles of due
process may properly be overthrown. A rebellion against Hitler or Sta-
lin would have been justified. In many other instances the issue is not
clear cut. The international community has approved rebellion against
colonial authority, but today not many colonies remain. 8
Nevertheless, as has been noted, prerevolutionary conditions exist
in many parts of the world. In some instances these conditions approach
tyranny-as was the case with regard to Batista-or the circumstances
create such frustrations that revolution is to be anticipated.
To envision a supranational authority which would quash unjusti-
fied rebellions or revolutions is inconceivable. The Congress of Vienna
and the Holy Alliance under Metternich attempted such a course in the
19th century; the result was disastrous.
On the other hand, the international community cannot be ex-
pected to and, indeed, should not encourage revolution. Such an ap-
266. Humphrey, Human Rights and Authority, 20 U. TORONTO L. REv. 412 (1970).
267. Modern tyranny has been defined as the disregard of all constitutional restrictions. M.
LATHER, TYRANNY-A STUDY IN THE ABUSE OF POWER (1969).
268. Akehart, State Responsibility for the Wrongs of a Rebellion-An Aspect of the South-
ern Rhodesia Revolution, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1969).
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proach would negate international order. Revolution cannot be con-
doned. Supranational insitutions must not, however, be wedded to the
status quo. Prerevolutionary conditions must be anticipated and efforts
must be made to establish effective institutions to initiate social change
by peaceful means. The effective implementation of the covenants on
Human and Political Rights and of Social and Economic Rights would
in themselves be a significant mechanism for peaceful change. The pro-
posal for World Habeas Corpus is a most effective antidote for tyranny.
World Habeas Corpus, along with a World Ombudsman, provides
an effective means for peaceful change in that the individual is made the
subject of international law. He becomes an actor with the right to
petition and to seek legal recourse. He is given an alternative to violence
and rebellion, e.g., with regard to apartheid in South Africa or racial
segregation in Rhodesia.
Supranational institutions must also deal with the fact of revolution
after it has occurred. Some rebellions, as in Rhodesia, cannot be ac-
cepted by the international community for they are contrary to the
shared norms of the world community."' In other circumstances, as in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the failure to prevent the quashing of a
rebellion remains a blot on the international conscience. Generally, in-
ternational institutions must permit revolutions to run their course while
seeking to humanize them. Where human rights are flaunted, World
Habeas Corpus would be used as a humanizing factor.
269. R. Emerson, Self Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971).
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